

**COMMON LAW ADMISSION TEST
(CLAT) 2026 Mock 202608:
ANSWER KEY AND SOLUTION**



**NISHANT PRAKASH
LAW CLASSES**

Gurukul for CLAT & AILET

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b)	(b)	(d)	(a)	(c)	(b)	(a)	(d)	(a)	(d)
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
(a)	(b)	(c)	(b)	(a)	(d)	(d)	(a)	(b)	(a)
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
(d)	(b)	(a)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(d)	(c)
31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
(d)	(a)	(d)	(a)	(c)	(d)	(b)	(d)	(c)	(a)
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
(b)	(c)	(d)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(c)
51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
(d)	(c)	(c)	(b)	(d)	(a)	(a)	(b)	(b)	(b)
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
(d)	(a)	(c)	(d)	(d)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(d)	(b)
71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
(b)	(a)	(d)	(a)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(d)	(b)
81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90
(c)	(d)	(c)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(c)	(d)	(b)	(b)
91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
(b)	(b)	(a)	(c)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(d)	(a)	(b)
101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110
(d)	(a)	(d)	(a)	(c)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(b)	(a)
111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120
(c)	(a)	(c)	(b)	(c)	(b)	(c)	(b)	(d)	(a)

Section - A : English Comprehension

1. **Correct Answer:** (b) Music transcends social prejudice and provides an intimate means of self-expression for the narrator.

Reference Line: "It started to speak a different language to me, a language so universal yet very personal, the only language that could articulate where words failed."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author's use of music as a "language" is metaphorical and emotional, not academic or intellectual. She does not seek to use music to connect with her peers in academia, who had already marginalized her. Instead, she turns to music as an escape from the alienation she faces. There is no indication that it helped her engage with colleagues on equal terms. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The author portrays music as a healing and liberating force that cuts across cultural and social barriers, offering her a deeply personal outlet. By describing it as "universal yet very personal," she suggests that music speaks to shared human emotion while also allowing her a space of private expression. It provides the acceptance and meaning that academia denied her. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) The passage does not show any renewed alignment with academic or cultural expectations. Rather, music serves as her rebellion against these expectations and a means to reclaim autonomy. Her choice to pursue music is not about reintegration into the environment that stifled her but about finding personal meaning outside it. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Nowhere does the author describe learning music as a duty or professional necessity. Her decision to take violin lessons is portrayed as a hopeful, deeply personal act, born from a desire for emotional refuge. It had nothing to do with building academic status or reputation. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

2. **Correct Answer:** (b) Preference for quiet substance and steady depth over flamboyance, encouraging reflective, methodical growth.

Reference Line: "He was not the sort of teacher who dazzled you with flamboyance; rather he is someone who carries a quiet depth."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The passage clearly states that the teacher "was not the sort of teacher who dazzled you with flamboyance," which contradicts the idea of him using showy tricks or shallow techniques to entertain beginners. There is no mention of him prioritizing instant appeal or theatrical instruction. The teacher's demeanor suggests depth

and restraint, not performative flair. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The teacher is described as carrying "a quiet depth," which directly supports this interpretation. He is not flashy but steady, implying a focus on serious, sustained practice rather than immediate display. This indicates that he fosters a calm, reflective learning atmosphere where students can develop gradually and meaningfully. His methodical nature stands in contrast to the superficial and fast-paced world the narrator is escaping from. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) There is no indication that the teacher mirrors the competitive, judgmental structure of academia. He does not rank students or demand measurable output. Rather, he seems to offer the narrator a more nurturing, non-hierarchical space, removed from the evaluative pressures she faces elsewhere. His role contrasts with the academic culture, not replicates it. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The passage does not imply urgency or any drive to prepare students for performance or public display. The teacher's quiet depth points to a process-oriented approach, valuing nuance over fast results. There is no evidence of emphasis on recital readiness or pressuring students to quickly accumulate pieces. Instead, the environment is patient and inward-focused. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

3. **Correct Answer:** (d) A search for meaning and safety beyond discrimination, creating a private, restorative refuge.

Reference Line: "Signing up for lessons was my small, hopeful attempt to hold onto something that could remind me of a life beyond the suffocating walls of academia, something that would offer me at least a semblance of meaning. A safe place that wouldn't discriminate."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) There is no indication that the narrator began violin lessons to impress others or restore professional credibility. Her decision is motivated by internal need, not public perception. She does not seek to elevate her status but rather to find emotional relief and escape the constant burden of marginalization in her academic environment. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) While the violin does serve as an alternative to confronting discrimination head-on, the passage does not suggest avoidance or denial. Instead, it portrays a deliberate, hopeful act of reclaiming meaning and identity. Music becomes an active form of self-care and resistance, not a passive distraction. The tone is one of

healing and purpose, not escapism. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The author's decision to learn the violin is not a form of assimilation. She explicitly resists conforming to external expectations, including clothing and cultural labels. The violin is not a tool to blend in or be accepted by dominant social groups. Rather, it represents her personal journey toward wholeness and affirmation outside of imposed identities. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The narrator describes her decision to learn the violin as "a small, hopeful attempt" to find meaning and a "safe place that wouldn't discriminate." This shows that her action is deeply restorative and symbolic. The violin offers emotional safety and self-expression in contrast to the alienation she feels in academia. It becomes a private sanctuary where she can breathe and belong without judgment. Hence, Option (d) is the correct answer.

4. Correct Answer: (a) showiness

Reference Line: "He was not the sort of teacher who dazzled you with flamboyance; rather he is someone who carries a quiet depth."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The term flamboyance typically refers to a striking, attention-grabbing style that relies on display, theatricality, or decorative excess. In the sentence, the teacher is explicitly said to not possess flamboyance but instead a "quiet depth," showing a contrast between outward showiness and inward substance. Among the choices, showiness best captures this contrast, as it directly aligns with the idea of dazzling others through surface-level performance. Hence, Option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) Humility suggests modesty and a lack of arrogance, which may seem like the opposite of flamboyance, but it's not a direct synonym. The word flamboyance emphasizes flashiness or visual drama rather than ego, and while humble people are not flamboyant, the two words are not interchangeable. In this context, humility would describe the teacher's personality, not his absence of flash. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) Austerity refers to plainness or severity, often involving self-discipline and minimalism. While this might be loosely contrasted with flamboyance, it carries connotations of harshness or strictness, which are not relevant to the teacher's character as described in the passage. He is "quiet," not stern or austere. Therefore, austerity is not an appropriate synonym for flamboyance in this usage. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Restraint implies holding back or self-control, especially in behavior or emotion. While someone who avoids flamboyance may practice restraint, this is a trait describing the absence of flamboyance, not a synonym for the word itself. Since the question asks for

a word with the same meaning as flamboyance—not its opposite—restraint does not fit. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

5. Correct Answer: (c) She challenges systemic prejudice through a quiet and deeply personal form of resistance.

Reference Line: "Signing up for lessons was my small, hopeful attempt to hold onto something that could remind me of a life beyond the suffocating walls of academia."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author critiques academia harshly, describing it as alienating, prejudiced, and emotionally suffocating. There is no indication that she found it open to artistic expression; in fact, her turn to music was a retreat from the toxic academic space. Thus, praising academia is inconsistent with her tone and experience. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) Although the author acknowledges her struggle with discrimination, she does not accept it passively or withdraw completely from life. Instead, she seeks solace and meaning through personal action—learning the violin. This represents quiet resistance, not surrender or social withdrawal. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The author's decision to learn the violin is framed as a deeply personal act of survival and self-assertion. She doesn't confront discrimination directly but creates a space for herself where prejudice cannot reach her. This choice reflects a form of resistance—calm, reflective, and rooted in self-expression rather than confrontation. Hence, Option (c) is the correct answer.

(d) There is no evidence that the author tried to assimilate or conform to dominant norms. On the contrary, she openly resists being stereotyped, and her journey is one of maintaining her identity while seeking freedom from judgment. She does not link academic success with changing who she is. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

6. Correct Answer: (b) She overcame the suffocating hostility of academia through solace and meaning in music.

Reference Line: "It was amidst such an air of bleakness that I turned, almost instinctively, to the violin... something that would offer me at least a semblance of meaning. A safe place that wouldn't discriminate."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author does not describe complete withdrawal from society. While she feels excluded and isolated within academia, she actively seeks relief and reconnection through music. Her violin practice is an act of engagement with life, not a disappearance from it. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage shows that the author finds music to be a deeply healing experience. In contrast to the discrimination she faced in academic spaces, music provides a sanctuary that is accepting and affirming. This emotional transformation—from bleakness to partial peace—is rooted in her relationship with the violin. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) The author never mentions filing complaints or taking formal action against colleagues or the institution. Her response is inward and personal rather than administrative or legal. Her resistance comes through reclaiming meaning for herself, not through confrontation. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Rather than adapting to discrimination, the author firmly resists being defined by it. She does not alter her appearance to fit others' expectations and rejects the notion of changing her identity to gain acceptance. Her act of turning to music is rooted in preserving her authenticity. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

7. Correct Answer: (a) lose their ability to distinguish people from software programs over time

Reference Line: "...computers are catching up... many computer systems still fail some of the simplest vision tests—thus reCAPTCHA's continued usefulness."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) lose their ability to distinguish people from software programs over time

The passage clearly suggests that as machine vision improves, traditional methods like reCAPTCHA may become ineffective because machines will start recognizing images the way humans do. This undermines the tool's ability to differentiate bots from people, making it obsolete. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) encourage developers to rely more on crowdsourced visual labeling tasks

Nowhere does the passage suggest that developers will turn to crowdsourcing visual labels as a result of improved AI. The concern is about distinguishing humans from machines, not about how training data is collected. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) transition toward using reading-based puzzles instead of visual challenges

The passage maintains its focus on visual recognition, not on reCAPTCHA shifting toward reading-based puzzles. It emphasizes the challenge of visual interpretation, not a change in CAPTCHA's nature. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) emphasize emotional intuition that artificial models cannot replicate easily

The text makes no reference to emotional intuition or affective computing as part of reCAPTCHA or AI training. The concerns lie in visual task performance,

not emotional limitations of machines. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

8. Correct Answer: (d) one breakthrough model set new standards for image interpretation accuracy

Reference Line: "A major leap forward... came in 2012... AlexNet... was able to correctly label images..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) human-annotated labels always outperform computer-generated guesses

Although the passage mentions labeled images used in training, it does not claim human labels are always superior. The focus is on the machine's improved ability to interpret images accurately, not on superiority of human input. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) machine vision became overdependent on curated training from datasets

The text acknowledges that AlexNet was trained using labeled data, but the emphasis is on the breakthrough it made in image interpretation, not dependency on datasets. There is no argument about overreliance. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) contests like ImageNet no longer reflect real-world recognition tasks

ImageNet is presented as a respected benchmark that challenged AI systems and led to major advancements. The author does not discredit its relevance or utility in real-world tasks. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) one breakthrough model set new standards for image interpretation accuracy

The passage highlights how AlexNet's success in 2012 was a pivotal moment in AI history. It exceeded expectations in labeling images accurately, setting a new benchmark for future models. Hence, option (d) is the correct answer.

9. Correct Answer: (a) object-based perception with pixel-level processing common in early models

Reference Line: "...training computers to see images as they are—made up of actual objects—rather than as just a collection of pixels."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) object-based perception with pixel-level processing common in early models

The author contrasts older models that saw images as unstructured pixels with newer systems trained to recognize objects as whole units. This shift aligns AI vision with how humans interpret visuals. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) abstract color patterns with advanced emotional analysis from images

The passage does not deal with emotional or abstract image interpretation. It strictly addresses physical and

structural perception rather than affective analysis. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) symbolic image encoding with complex brain states formed by intuition

There is no mention of symbolic encoding or brain states in the passage. The comparison is between two visual processing methods, not philosophical or neurological models. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) automatic data generation with natural reasoning linked to language use

The text does not link image recognition with reasoning or language. It remains confined to object recognition in images and does not explore cross-modal reasoning. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

10. Correct Answer: (d) AI models have surpassed all human capabilities in visual interpretation tasks

Reference Line: "...many computer systems still fail some of the simplest vision tests..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) Modern visual systems are being trained to perceive complex object structures

The author clearly explains how newer systems are now trained to see images as actual objects, a sign of progress in AI vision models. This supports the view that AI is evolving structurally. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) reCAPTCHA continues to function because AI still makes simple mistakes

The author explicitly mentions that reCAPTCHA remains useful because machines still fail basic image tests, making this view entirely aligned with the passage. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) Neural systems improve by studying labeled visuals and building connections

The text describes how artificial neurons are trained with labeled images to mimic how human brains process visuals. This process of learning aligns with the author's explanation. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) AI models have surpassed all human capabilities in visual interpretation tasks

The author clarifies that while AI has improved, many models still fail basic tests. Claiming they have surpassed human abilities contradicts the core argument of the passage. Hence, option (d) is the correct answer.

11. Correct Answer: (a) AI vision improves when models learn to detect shapes rather than pixel sets

Reference Line: "...training computers to see images as they are—made up of actual objects..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) AI vision improves when models learn to detect shapes rather than pixel sets

The author stresses that training machines to see objects—rather than just raw pixels—is central to their progress. This supports structured interpretation as the key to success. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) CAPTCHA tools must evolve by introducing emotion-based interpretation tests

No mention is made of emotional recognition or affective computing. The focus is on visual accuracy and object identification, not emotional testing. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) Future systems should avoid mimicking humans to preserve design flexibility

The passage embraces the idea of mimicking human vision, training systems to see like humans do. It does not advocate for divergence from human methods. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Modern benchmarks must incorporate questions involving ethical decision-making

There is no reference to ethical or moral dimensions in AI testing benchmarks. The passage focuses solely on object recognition and image classification. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

12. Correct Answer: (b) exploratory

Reference Line: "The quest to create computers that can 'see' has made huge progress in recent years."

Difficulty Level: Moderate

Explanation:

(a) Although the passage does highlight the shortcomings of current computer vision systems—such as their continued failure in simple reCAPTCHA tests—it does not do so in a combative or critical tone. The language is not emotionally charged or designed to provoke disagreement. Instead, it offers a calm and objective analysis of the field's progress and limitations. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage thoughtfully traces the development of machine vision from its early, error-prone stages to more recent advances like the emergence of convolutional neural networks and the success of AlexNet. The tone is measured, fact-based, and curious, guiding the reader through milestones in the field. This open-ended discussion of technological evolution is best described as exploratory. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) While the passage refers to the past—for example, the state of AI 15 years ago or the ImageNet win in 2012—there is no emotional fondness or longing for those times. The purpose of these references is not to express regret or admiration for the past but to contrast it with current achievements. The tone remains analytical, not sentimental. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The author does acknowledge impressive progress in machine vision, particularly in recognition accuracy and robotic application. However, they also note ongoing failures, such as the inability of AI to pass basic visual tests. This balanced approach—highlighting

both progress and persisting issues—disqualifies the tone from being purely celebratory. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

13. Correct Answer: (c) heightens its apparent size due to how the brain frames surrounding elements

Reference Line: “At that low angle, the ‘moon illusion’ makes it appear larger than it truly is — an optical quirk that occurs when our brains compare the moon with nearby landmarks...”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The passage does not mention any astronomical event involving eclipses nor suggests the moon’s position enables it to block other celestial objects. Eclipses involve specific orbital alignments, not mere appearance near the horizon. This option introduces unrelated astronomical consequences and is therefore misdirected. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The text does not reference any difficulty in capturing the moon photographically due to its low angle. While atmospheric distortion might affect imaging in reality, the author focuses solely on human perception, not on technical challenges. This distractor incorrectly shifts the focus to scientific instrumentation. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The passage clearly attributes the perceived enlargement of the moon to the psychological comparison with ground-level landmarks like trees and buildings. This “moon illusion” is a well-documented perceptual bias triggered by proximity to the horizon. The author uses this effect to explain a commonly observed optical trick. Hence, Option (c) is the correct answer.

(d) The author does mention that atmospheric scattering causes a golden-orange hue at low altitudes, but brightness reduction is not the focus here. Instead, the low angle is linked to increased visual size, not diminished luminance. The explanation confuses two unrelated phenomena. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

14. Correct Answer: (b) archetypal

Reference Line: “...reaches peak fullness almost simultaneously with its closest approach to Earth, creating the ideal combination for an impressive supermoon spectacle.”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) “Improbable” suggests the situation could be bettered, but the passage describes the timing and alignment as the most optimal possible. The term “ideal” is used to indicate perfection, not potential for enhancement. This misinterpretation weakens the

intended sense of completeness. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) “Archetypal” denotes a perfect or best-case model, which aligns with the author’s portrayal of the rare celestial alignment. The combination of perigee and full phase is presented as the most impressive manifestation of a supermoon. This synonym fits the tone and meaning precisely. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) “Fabricated” implies artificial creation, but the event is naturally occurring and astronomically explained. The passage emphasizes scientific accuracy and alignment, not illusion or falsification. This choice distorts the meaning of “ideal.” Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) “Incomplete” conveys a sense of deficiency, while the author stresses how this particular supermoon reaches both proximity and fullness simultaneously. This direct contrast with the context renders the word inappropriate. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

15. Correct Answer: (a) To highlight the rare visual dominance of the moon during intense supermoons

Reference Line: “The added brightness is enough to wash out fainter stars and even cast faint shadows on the ground...”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author uses the phrase to underscore the visual power of the supermoon, whose brightness overwhelms nearby celestial features. This effect is described as rare and spectacular, enhancing the moon’s uniqueness during its closest approach. The emphasis is clearly on visual dominance, not disruption. Hence, Option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) While the passage mentions fainter stars being obscured, it does not suggest disapproval or raise concerns about light pollution. The tone is descriptive and celebratory, not critical. Introducing a negative implication misreads the author’s intent. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The author does not reference animals or any ecological impact. The passage is concerned with human perception and visual spectacle, not environmental consequences. This option inserts an unrelated and unsupported idea. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) No comparison is made between lunar brightness and artificial lighting. The moon’s luminosity is discussed in astronomical terms, without any reference to human-made sources. This distractor invents a parallel not drawn by the author. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

16. Correct Answer: (d) A perfect overlap of perigee and full phase produces a visibly larger and brighter moon.

Reference Line: "...reaches peak fullness almost simultaneously with its closest approach to Earth, creating the ideal combination for an impressive supermoon spectacle."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) Lunar eclipses are not discussed in the passage and are unrelated to the formation of a supermoon. A supermoon occurs due to the alignment of the moon's perigee with its full phase, not due to an eclipse. This option introduces a separate astronomical event that is not supported by the text. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The moon never becomes invisible due to orbital shifts in the context of a supermoon. The passage emphasizes increased brightness and size during a supermoon, not disappearance. Visibility is enhanced, not reduced, when the moon is near perigee and full phase. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) While proximity is a major factor in the moon's brightness, the passage clearly explains that timing—specifically the alignment of the moon's full phase with its perigee—is also essential. Supermoons that do not align perfectly with full phase appear less impressive. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option directly reflects the central idea of the passage. A supermoon reaches its most striking appearance when the full phase and perigee overlap precisely, making the moon appear both larger and brighter than usual. The passage emphasizes that this November's moon achieves exactly that alignment. Hence, Option (d) is the correct answer.

17. Correct Answer: (d) The moon's visual size always increases when it is at apogee from Earth

Reference Line: "When the moon is at apogee — the farthest point in its orbit from Earth — the result is a smaller, dimmer micro full moon."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The passage states that the November 2025 moon reaches full phase at the same time it's closest to Earth, which is a rare alignment responsible for making the supermoon appear larger than usual. This statement is consistent with the text and reflects the scientific explanation provided. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The moon's brightness is said to be intense enough during supermoons to wash out fainter stars and "even cast faint shadows," making this a true and emphasized point in the passage. It's presented as a rare but observable effect of extreme lunar brightness. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The passage predicts that the moon will appear similarly large and bright again on November 24, 2026, making this statement factually accurate. It directly

references the future occurrence of a comparable supermoon. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The moon's apogee is its farthest distance from Earth, and the passage states clearly that when the moon is at apogee, it appears smaller and dimmer—a phenomenon called a micro full moon. Thus, the claim that its size increases at apogee is factually incorrect. Hence, Option (d) is the correct answer.

18. Correct Answer: (a) Cultural naming practices reflect seasonal cycles and survival-based observations

Reference Line: "...used by various Indigenous peoples of North America—marks the season when beavers build their winter lodges and when trappers once set out before rivers froze over."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The passage explains that the name "beaver moon" originates from Indigenous communities who observed natural cycles such as beavers building lodges and the timing of human activities like trapping before rivers froze. These names were tied to survival and seasonal change, reflecting how cultural knowledge was built around environmental cues and practical timing. This interpretation directly aligns with the reference and context. Hence, Option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) The passage presents Indigenous terminology respectfully and with clear attribution, indicating appreciation rather than discouragement. There is no suggestion that scientific writing discourages such cultural terms; in fact, their inclusion highlights relevance and continuity. Therefore, this option introduces a claim that is unsupported by the text. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) Although early settlers are briefly mentioned in the context of setting out to trap before freezing rivers, the focus is not on prioritizing astronomy over agriculture. The passage centers on naming practices grounded in environmental necessity, not in replacing one set of priorities with another. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) While moon phases have inspired poetry and art, the passage clearly frames the "beaver moon" name within a practical, survival-oriented context. The naming was based on observable behavior in nature and seasonal tasks, not on aesthetic or symbolic reasons. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

19. Correct Answer: (b) It aligned political participation with solitary leisure and calm private decisions

Reference Line: "...the shift occurred, it seemed to bring elections into line with so many other kinds of 19th-century leisure-time activities."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The secret ballot did mark a transition to privacy, but the passage does not suggest it was about protest

or turning public dissent into personal gestures. It focuses more on the cultural shift toward quieter participation, not redefining protest as individualized symbolism. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage explicitly draws a parallel between secret voting and private, peaceful leisure activities of the 19th century. This reflects the author's view that the democratic act of voting began to resemble solitary acts like reading or relaxation, changing its tone from communal to private. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) Shared consensus suggests collective decision-making, but the secret ballot was introduced to reduce such communal influence. The author implies that elections moved away from consensus toward individual and even atomized choices. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Ritualistic formalism and traditional community methods imply historical or ceremonial voting, whereas the secret ballot marked a departure from public procedures to private acts, as emphasized in the passage. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

20. Correct Answer: (a) The involvement of social scientists in structuring and analyzing behavioral tendencies

Reference Line: "...new kinds of social scientists came to the fore... exploring who makes what choices under what conditions..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author highlights how social scientists extended democratic ideals into fields like psychiatry and marketing by studying and structuring decision-making. This professionalization of choice analysis is presented as the logical evolution of earlier democratic participation. Hence, Option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) A coalition of stakeholders is never discussed in the passage. While several professionals are mentioned, the text emphasizes their function in shaping behavior, not the distribution of decision-making authority. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) Consumer participation is referenced, but not in terms of expressive identity or self-representation. The focus is on structural framing of decisions, not market-driven personal expression. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Elected officials and public perception management are not central to the passage. The shift was toward non-political figures—social scientists—who reshaped how choices were framed, not how politicians influenced citizens. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

21. Correct Answer: (d) systematic methods were developed to assess patterns of human preference and direction

Reference Line: "...exploring who makes what choices under what conditions and with what effects..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author does not claim these sciences rejected logical models in favor of emotional ones. Rather, they used structured empirical methods rooted in social science, not emotional intuition. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage discusses behavioral experts, not political officials or their role in electoral reform. There's no indication that the "invention" referred to changes in the structure of voting systems. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) While consumer behavior is studied by marketers, the passage frames this within analytical research rather than manipulative retail strategies. It describes observation, not exploitation. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The phrase refers to emerging disciplines such as behavioral psychology and marketing science that systematically studied and categorized how people made decisions. These fields developed tools to identify and predict human choices under controlled conditions. Hence, Option (d) is the correct answer.

22. Correct Answer: (b) To illustrate how decision-making frameworks extended beyond adult consumers

Reference Line: "...to include women, poor people, sometimes even children, especially in places where mass goods... became widely available."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The passage does not mention any legal reforms related to voting rights for children. Instead, the reference to children appears in the context of consumer participation, such as accessing mass goods. The focus is on the broadening of decision-making roles beyond adults, not civic legislation. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The inclusion of children alongside women and the poor shows how consumer culture and market choice extended even to those previously excluded from such influence. With the availability of mass-produced goods, children became part of a system of consumption and individual decision-making. This reflects the passage's focus on expanding frameworks of choice beyond typical adult consumers. Hence, Option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) Although moral concerns might be valid in a different context, the passage does not discuss ethical worries about marketing to children. The reference is observational rather than critical, noting their role in choice-making rather than warning against it. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) There is no indication that the passage views children as targets of exploitative advertising. The

author is focused on the broader social expansion of participation in consumer activity, not on manipulation or psychological targeting of youth. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

23. Correct Answer: (a) Through repetitive acts of self-selection encouraged by structured environments and systems

Reference Line: "...ordinary people participated... every time they sat on a couch for a therapy session or filled out a survey card..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The author gives several examples of routine, structured activities—therapy sessions, surveys, exams—through which people regularly practiced decision-making. These repeated, normalized forms of selection helped solidify the idea of humans as choosers. Such systems encouraged ongoing acts of personal judgment within controlled settings. Hence, Option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) Public campaigns are not discussed in the passage. While political parties and preachers are mentioned as early influencers of choice, the institutionalization of choice is shown to occur through everyday systems, not organized promotion of civic identity. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The passage does not mention coercion or legal requirements to participate in consumerism or therapy. Participation in surveys and other choice-driven contexts is portrayed as voluntary and normalized rather than mandated by law. Hence, Option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Emotional appeals or moral glorification of choice are not central to the author's argument. Instead, the tone is analytical and descriptive, focusing on the mechanisms and actors that shaped structured choice-making. There's no suggestion that choosing was

romanticized or elevated to a moral act. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

24. Correct Answer: (c) The gradual absorption of civic identity into patterns of private preference and decision

Reference Line: "...overcoming the longstanding objections of even liberals like John Stuart Mill, who worried that the last stronghold of public life would in this way be privatised."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) Although the passage links politics and consumerism, it does not suggest that either one is driven by emotional fluctuations similar to market trends. The focus is on the systematization and privatization of decision-making, not on mood-based behavior. Hence, Option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage does not describe a decline of public institutions or their replacement by corporations. It emphasizes how individual choice, even in civic contexts like voting, became privatized and modeled after leisure and consumption practices. Hence, Option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The key idea is that the act of choosing—once a public, collective experience in elections—became increasingly privatized, mirroring consumer behavior. The concern about John Stuart Mill's warning reflects this transformation of civic identity into personal preference. The blending of political and consumer patterns forms the main argument. Hence, Option (c) is the correct answer.

(d) While branding and goods are mentioned, the passage does not claim that loyalty to consumer products replaced community ties. It is more concerned with how participation and identity shifted from collective decision-making to personal, system-driven choices. Hence, Option (d) is not the correct answer.

Section - B : Current Affairs including General Knowledge

25. Correct Answer: (a) The RSS was founded in 1925 by Indian physician Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in Nagpur city.

Explanation: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was established in 1925 in Nagpur by Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, a physician and freedom activist. The organization sought to foster unity, discipline, and national consciousness among Indians during colonial rule. Over time, the RSS grew into a vast volunteer network dedicated to cultural preservation, community service, and nation-building, shaping key aspects of India's socio-political landscape.

26. Correct Answer: (b) Rule 5(1)

Explanation: Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 clearly prohibits government servants from being members of, or otherwise associating with, any political party or organisation that engages in political activities. It also bars them from aiding, assisting, or subscribing to any political movement. The rule ensures political neutrality among public servants and upholds the impartiality and integrity of the civil service in India's democratic framework.

27. Correct Answer: (a) Shakhas

Explanation: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) functions through a vast network of shakhas, or local branches, spread across India and other countries. Each shakha serves as a community-level platform where daily activities focus on physical training, intellectual discussions, and cultural education. These gatherings are central to nurturing discipline, leadership, and a sense of national service among members. The other terms listed do not represent the core organizational structure of the RSS.

28. Correct Answer: (b) Only II and III

Explanation: In 1966, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) formally issued an order barring government employees from participating in activities of both the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, citing the need to maintain political neutrality in public service. The RSS was initially banned on February 4, 1948, in the aftermath of Mahatma Gandhi's assassination by Nathuram Godse, who had earlier been associated with the organization. However, the ban was lifted in July 1949 after the RSS agreed to adopt a written constitution, clarifying its non-political, cultural character and ensuring its activities would remain within democratic norms.

29. Correct Answer: (d) Stamp and coin

Explanation: To celebrate the 100 years of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Prime Minister

Narendra Modi released a special commemorative postage stamp and coin. These releases symbolize the RSS's century-long journey dedicated to nation-building, social service, and cultural unity. Such commemorative issues serve as historical markers honoring institutions that have made significant contributions to India's social and national development.

30. Correct Answer: (c) India joined ASEAN as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, marking renewed cooperation.

Explanation: India formally began its engagement with ASEAN in 1992, when it became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner, symbolizing a major step toward reconnecting with Southeast Asia after years of limited interaction during the Cold War. This initiative laid the foundation for India's Look East Policy, later transformed into the Act East Policy, emphasizing greater regional economic, cultural, and strategic cooperation.

31. Correct Answer: (d) Timor-Leste

Explanation: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expanded to 11 members with the addition of Timor-Leste (East Timor). This inclusion marks ASEAN's first enlargement since its founding in 1967. The other members — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam — were already part of the bloc. Timor-Leste's membership reflects ASEAN's commitment to regional unity and inclusivity. Countries like Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, and Bangladesh are not ASEAN members.

32. Correct Answer: (a) Only I and II

Explanation: ASEAN was formally established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, through the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by five founding countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

Statement III is incorrect because ASEAN was not founded in Malaysia, but in Thailand, and the founding document is known as the Bangkok Declaration, not merely "the Declaration." These details are key to the accurate historical account of ASEAN's establishment.

33. Correct Answer: (d) Security and Growth for All in the Region

Explanation: India's SAGAR doctrine stands for "Security and Growth for All in the Region", reflecting India's inclusive vision for maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The policy aligns closely with ASEAN's maritime priorities under the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), focusing on freedom of navigation, sustainable resource use, and

coordinated disaster relief efforts. Through its consistent role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, India has emerged as a reliable regional partner for ASEAN nations.

34. Correct Answer: (a) Nalanda University

Explanation: At the 2025 ASEAN-India Summit, India introduced key initiatives to deepen strategic and academic ties with Southeast Asia. Among them was the establishment of a Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Nalanda University, aimed at promoting regional research, policy dialogue, and cultural understanding. This initiative complements India's broader Act East Policy, reinforcing its role as a knowledge and strategic partner to ASEAN nations.

35. Correct Answer: (c) Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience

Explanation: At the 2025 ASEAN-India Summit, chaired under the theme "Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience," Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized completing the review of the ASEAN-India FTA (AITIGA) and advancing cooperation in trade, tourism, and digital partnerships. As part of this framework, he announced a 10-point plan, including celebrating 2025 as the ASEAN-India Year of Tourism with USD 5 million allocated for joint initiatives. The theme reflects the shared goal of strengthening regional supply chains, infrastructure, and people-to-people ties between India and ASEAN nations.

36. Correct Answer: (d) Seventh

Explanation: India has been elected to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for the 2026-28 term, marking its seventh tenure on the Geneva-based body. This reflects India's consistent commitment to upholding global human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Over the years, India has actively contributed to dialogues on gender equality, social justice, and inclusive development, emphasizing the importance of balancing rights with responsibilities. Its re-election reinforces the global recognition of India's constructive role in multilateral human rights institutions.

37. Correct Answer: (b) 47

Explanation: The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is composed of 47 Member States elected by the UN General Assembly on a regional representation basis. It serves as the UN's primary intergovernmental body for promoting and protecting human rights around the world. The Council addresses violations, responds to emergencies, and makes recommendations for better human rights implementation. Its structure ensures geographical balance, with representation from all major regions — Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America & the Caribbean, and Western Europe & others.

38. Correct Answer: (d) All I, II and III

Explanation: All three statements are correct. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) distributes its 47 seats among five regional groups to ensure balanced geographical representation. Both African States and Asia-Pacific States hold 13 seats each, Eastern European States have 6 seats, Latin American and Caribbean States possess 8 seats, and Western European and other States hold 7 seats. This regional distribution ensures diversity and equal participation in the Council's deliberations on human rights promotion and protection worldwide.

39. Correct Answer: (c) India has been a member since 2006 except for mandatory breaks in 2011, 2018, and 2025 in the membership cycle.

Explanation:

India has been part of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) since its establishment in 2006, with only three mandatory breaks — in 2011, 2018, and 2025 — due to rotational term limits that prevent continuous re-election. This record demonstrates India's consistent engagement in global human rights initiatives, reflecting its diplomatic credibility, democratic values, and commitment to multilateral cooperation under the UN framework.

40. Correct Answer: (a) Three-year

Explanation: According to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) announcement, India has been elected for a three-year term starting January 1, 2026. The election results, shared through an official UNHRC social media post, reaffirm India's continued commitment to promoting human rights, democracy, and global equality on the international stage. This marks another milestone in India's diplomatic engagement within the UN framework, reflecting its leadership role in global governance.

41. Correct Answer: (b) Section 2(1)(d)

Explanation: According to Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA), 1993, "Human Rights" refer to the rights related to life, liberty, equality, and dignity of the individual, as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution or embodied in international covenants, and enforceable by Indian courts. This section forms the core legal foundation for the functioning of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in safeguarding civil and constitutional rights across the nation.

42. Correct Answer: (c) 6th

Explanation: India ranks 6th globally and 2nd in the Asia-Pacific region for the highest number of UNESCO World Heritage Sites, underscoring its immense cultural and natural wealth. The nation's 42 heritage sites include ancient monuments, temples, forts, and biodiversity-rich landscapes such as the Taj Mahal, Ajanta Caves, Jaipur City, and the Sundarbans National

Park. This recognition reflects India's deep historical legacy and its ongoing efforts to conserve sites of outstanding universal value through initiatives led by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) and the Ministry of Culture.

43. Correct Answer: (d) From the 17th to 19th centuries CE

Explanation: The network of twelve forts, part of the Maratha Military Landscapes, spans from the 17th to 19th centuries CE, symbolizing the empire's unmatched strategic vision and fortification expertise. These forts, built across rugged terrains, reflect the Marathas' ability to blend military precision with architectural ingenuity, playing a vital role in defending territories and asserting regional control.

44. Correct Answer: (c) Gingee

Explanation: As part of UNESCO's 2025 recognition of the "Maratha Military Landscapes of India," a total of twelve forts were inscribed as World Heritage Sites — eleven from Maharashtra and one from Tamil Nadu. The Gingee Fort, located in Villupuram district, is the only fort outside Maharashtra to be included in this prestigious list. The site stands out for its remarkable defensive architecture, triple hill fortifications, and historical significance as a strategic stronghold under the Marathas, Cholas, and later the Mughals.

45. Correct Answer: (a) Only I and II

Explanation: Statements I and II are correct. UNESCO inscribed the forts under cultural criteria (iv) and (vi), recognizing their Outstanding Universal Value (OUV). Criterion (iv) acknowledges sites that are outstanding examples of architectural or technological ensembles or landscapes, while criterion (vi) includes places that are directly associated with events, traditions, ideas, beliefs, or artistic and literary works of global significance. Statement III is incorrect because it inaccurately narrows criterion (vi) to only artistic works, excluding other important cultural associations like traditions and beliefs, which are explicitly included under UNESCO's definition.

46. Correct Answer: (b) Department of Cultural Affairs

Explanation: The Department of Cultural Affairs, in coordination with the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums and the Government of Maharashtra, prepared the proposal for UNESCO recognition of the Maratha Military Landscapes. This initiative highlighted the architectural excellence, strategic design, and cultural legacy of the Maratha forts. The other departments listed were not responsible for this specific UNESCO nomination process.

47. Correct Answer: (a) UNESCO functions through three key organs: the General Conference, Secretariat,

and Executive Board, working collectively on governance and oversight.

Explanation: UNESCO's structure is built around three principal organs: the General Conference, which sets global priorities and approves the budget; the Executive Board, which ensures policy implementation and oversight; and the Secretariat, led by the Director-General, which executes day-to-day operations. The other options are incorrect as they either cite non-existent bodies or misrepresent UNESCO's internal organization.

48. Correct Answer: (b) Only II and III

Explanation: The Treaty of Sugauli (1815), signed between Nepal and the British East India Company, established Nepal's modern boundaries after the Anglo-Nepalese War. It significantly reduced Nepal's territorial control, leading to the cession of regions such as Sikkim, Kumaon, Garhwal, and parts of the Terai. The treaty shaped Nepal's present-day borders and diplomatic standing in the region. Statement I is incorrect because both the Pashupatinath Temple and Lumbini are located in Nepal, though they symbolize the enduring spiritual and cultural bond that connects India and Nepal through Hinduism and Buddhism. Critics accused the government of seeking to stifle an anti-corruption campaign with the ban, which was repealed on Monday night. While the ban was a catalyst for the current unrest, protesters are also channelling a more deep-rooted dissatisfaction with the country's authorities.

49. Correct Answer: (c) 26

Explanation: The Nepalese government banned 26 social media platforms, including WhatsApp, Instagram, and Facebook, after they failed to comply with a mandatory registration deadline set by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. The decision, aimed at tightening online regulation, sparked widespread demonstrations across the country, with critics arguing that the move threatens freedom of expression and digital rights.

50. Correct Answer: (c) Surya Kiran

Explanation: Surya Kiran is the joint military exercise between India and Nepal, aimed at enhancing interoperability, coordination, and mutual understanding between the two armies. The exercise primarily focuses on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and disaster relief operations. It serves as a cornerstone of India-Nepal defence cooperation and highlights the traditional and cultural bonds between the two countries, reinforced by the participation of Nepalese citizens in India's Gorkha regiments and regular defence exchanges.

51. Correct Answer: (d) Sushila Karki

Explanation: Sushila Karki, former Chief Justice of Nepal, became the country's first female Prime Minister after the previous government fell amid intense protests. Known for her strong stance against corruption during her tenure as Chief Justice (2016–2017), she earned national respect for judicial integrity and reformist zeal. Her appointment to lead an interim government marks a significant milestone in Nepal's democratic and gender inclusion journey.

52. **Correct Answer:** (c) Generation Z

Explanation: Generation Z, defined as those born between 1997 and 2012, has become synonymous with youth activism worldwide. In Nepal, they brought down a government within 48 hours; in Madagascar and Indonesia, they mobilized movements demanding transparency and reforms. Their unified voice against corruption and inequality showcases their increasing role in shaping political and economic discourse across continents.

53. Correct Answer: (c) Parliament's amendment overrides the State law despite Presidential assent having been granted earlier.

Reference: "a conflicting State law on a Concurrent subject prevails within that State if it has been reserved for, and received, the President's assent, but Parliament may later amend, vary, or repeal that State law and reassert primacy."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option wrongly assumes that Presidential assent under Article 254(2) creates permanent immunity for State laws against subsequent Parliamentary action. The passage explicitly provides that Parliament retains the power to "amend, vary, or repeal" a State law even after Presidential assent, thereby reasserting Central primacy on Concurrent subjects. The protection afforded by Presidential assent is only temporary and conditional, lasting until Parliament chooses to exercise its overriding legislative authority. The constitutional framework ensures Parliamentary supremacy is maintained even after a State law has received Presidential assent, preventing any permanent insulation of State legislation from Central control.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option misunderstands the repugnancy analysis by focusing only on the current similarity in inspection intervals while ignoring the broader regulatory framework. The laws initially prescribed different standards and established different penalty regimes, creating repugnancy that triggered the need for Presidential assent. Parliament's subsequent amendment does not transform the relationship into concurrent operation; rather, it reasserts Parliamentary supremacy over the State law under Article 254(2)'s exception mechanism. The fact that inspection frequencies now align does not validate concurrent operation when Parliament has legislated on the same subject matter, thereby exercising its constitutional right to override the State law.

Option (c) Correct: This accurately reflects Article 254(2)'s operation as explained in the passage, where Presidential assent allows a conflicting State law to prevail within the State temporarily but Parliament may later legislate to reassert its primacy. The amendment to the Factory Standards Act constitutes such subsequent Parliamentary action, making the State law void despite the earlier Presidential assent. The passage clearly establishes that Parliament's

power to "amend, vary, or repeal" includes making substantive changes to the regulatory framework that effectively supersede the State law. This maintains the constitutional balance by permitting State-specific variations while preserving ultimate Parliamentary authority over Concurrent subjects.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option fails to recognize that Parliamentary action under Article 254(2) need not be an explicit repeal to override a State law that received Presidential assent. The passage clarifies that Parliament may "amend, vary, or repeal" the State law to reassert primacy, and any of these forms of legislative action suffices. An amendment that addresses the same subject matter and modifies the regulatory framework constitutes sufficient Parliamentary action to override the State law's temporary protection under Presidential assent. The constitutional scheme does not require Parliament to expressly mention or formally repeal the State law; substantive legislation on the same Concurrent subject is adequate to reassert Central supremacy.

54. Correct Answer: (b) Pith and substance sustains the State law as it substantially falls within State List competence.

Reference: "Where a State law is substantially within the State List and touches a Union/Concurrent matter only incidentally, its validity may be sustained by the doctrine of pith and substance (competence issue rather than repugnancy)."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option incorrectly assumes automatic invalidity when there is any overlap between State legislation and a Central law on a Concurrent subject, without considering whether the State law's primary legislative character falls within State List competence. The passage clarifies that where a State law is substantially within the State List and only incidentally touches upon a Union or Concurrent matter, the doctrine of pith and substance resolves the issue as a competence matter rather than triggering repugnancy analysis. The constitutional framework does not mandate automatic Central supremacy in every instance of overlap; rather, it requires careful examination of the law's true nature and primary purpose before concluding that Article 254 applies.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately applies the principle stated in the passage that when a State law is

substantially referable to the State List and only incidentally trenches upon Union or Concurrent matters, the doctrine of pith and substance validates its legislative competence. Since the State law is primarily enacted under Entry 26 of the State List (trade and commerce within the State) and the price control provisions merely touch upon essential commodities incidentally as part of broader trade regulation, this is a competence issue rather than a repugnancy issue. The State law remains valid without requiring Presidential assent because it is not truly a law "on a Concurrent subject" but rather a State List enactment with incidental effects on Concurrent matters.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option conflates competence issues with repugnancy issues, failing to recognize that Presidential assent under Article 254(2) is required only when a State law that is truly "on a Concurrent subject" conflicts with a Central law. However, when pith and substance analysis reveals that the State law is substantially within State List competence, as in regulating intra-State trade and commerce, it is not properly characterized as a law on a Concurrent subject for Article 254 purposes. The passage distinguishes between laws that are substantially within State List competence (where pith and substance determines validity) and laws on Concurrent subjects (where repugnancy analysis and potentially Presidential assent become relevant), making this option's invocation of Article 254(2) inappropriate.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option fails to distinguish between true repugnancy situations involving laws on Concurrent subjects and cases where the doctrine of pith and substance applies to resolve competence questions. The passage specifically notes that when a State law is substantially referable to the State List and only incidentally trenches upon Union or Concurrent matters, it is a competence issue resolved by pith and substance, not a repugnancy issue requiring Article 254 analysis. The fact that both laws have some regulatory effect on essential commodities does not automatically trigger repugnancy analysis when the State law's primary legislative character and substantial purpose lie within exclusive State List competence, making the essential commodities aspect merely incidental rather than central to the State legislation.

55. Correct Answer: (d) Alternative remedies and different procedures are insufficient to establish repugnancy.

Reference: "The conflict must be clear, direct, and irreconcilable, such that obeying one necessarily means disobeying the other; mere overlap, different procedures, or alternative remedies are insufficient."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: While this option correctly notes that stricter standards allow for simultaneous compliance without technical disobedience of either law, it provides an incomplete analysis by focusing solely on the emission standards aspect of the regulatory framework. The passage requires examining whether obeying one law necessarily means disobeying the other, and this option does not address the complete framework including the procedural and remedial differences that are explicitly identified in the passage as insufficient grounds for establishing repugnancy. A comprehensive repugnancy analysis must consider all aspects of the laws, including substantive standards, procedural mechanisms, and remedial forums, to determine whether there exists the requisite "clear, direct, and irreconcilable" conflict that the passage mandates.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly equates operating in the same regulatory field with automatic repugnancy, disregarding the passage's emphasis on strict preconditions for declaring laws repugnant. The passage establishes that repugnancy requires more than mere overlap or same-field operation; it must involve "clear, direct, and irreconcilable" conflict where obeying one necessarily means disobeying the other. The passage explicitly states that "mere overlap, different procedures, or alternative remedies are insufficient" to establish repugnancy, making this conclusion legally unsound. Operating in the same field is a necessary but not sufficient condition for repugnancy; the constitutional doctrine requires demonstration of actual, irreconcilable inconsistency rather than presuming conflict from field overlap alone.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option fundamentally misunderstands Article 254(2)'s operation within the constitutional framework governing Concurrent List legislation. Presidential assent is not required for all State laws on Concurrent subjects; rather, it is an exception mechanism that allows a conflicting State law to prevail within the State when there is actual, established repugnancy with a Central law. The passage makes clear that repugnancy must first be established through strict preconditions, including demonstration of clear, direct, and irreconcilable conflict, before Presidential assent becomes relevant as

a potential saving provision. States are entitled to legislate on Concurrent subjects, and such legislation is valid unless and until it is shown to be repugnant to existing Central legislation.

Option (d) Correct: This accurately applies the strict preconditions for repugnancy stated in the passage, recognizing that the threshold requires more than procedural differences or alternative remedial mechanisms. Since the laws provide alternative remedies through different forums (specialized tribunals versus state appellate boards) and different procedures, and compliance with the stricter emission standard satisfies both laws' substantive requirements, the threshold of "clear, direct, and irreconcilable" conflict is not met. The passage explicitly identifies that "mere overlap, different procedures, or alternative remedies are insufficient" to constitute repugnancy, and the present scenario falls squarely within this principle. The existence of stricter standards and parallel forums does not create the necessary inconsistency where obeying one law requires disobeying the other.

56. Correct Answer: (a) Article 254 repugnancy analysis applies only to conflicts on Concurrent List subjects.

Reference: "In India, the doctrine is codified in Article 254 and chiefly operates on Concurrent List subjects where both Parliament and State Legislatures may legislate."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately reflects the constitutional scope and applicability of Article 254's repugnancy doctrine as specifically stated in the passage. The repugnancy doctrine "chiefly operates on Concurrent List subjects where both Parliament and State Legislatures may legislate," establishing that it is designed for situations of concurrent legislative competence. When laws derive from the Union List and State List respectively, as in the present case where one law flows from Union List Entry 9 and the other from State List Entry 18, they represent exercises of exclusive legislative competence under Article 246, and any conflicts are resolved through competence analysis and determination of the true legislative character rather than through Article 254's repugnancy mechanism, which presupposes concurrent power.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly extends Article 254's repugnancy analysis beyond its

constitutionally defined scope to conflicts between laws deriving from different exclusive List entries. While operational conflicts may exist between laws from the Union List and State List, the passage clearly establishes that Article 254's repugnancy doctrine is specifically designed for conflicts on Concurrent List subjects where both legislatures have concurrent power to legislate. The existence of overlapping recovery mechanisms does not automatically invoke repugnancy analysis; rather, the constitutional framework requires first determining whether both laws are on Concurrent subjects. When laws derive from exclusive List entries, conflicts are addressed through legislative competence questions under Article 246, not repugnancy under Article 254.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option appears to invoke the "occupied field" or "covering the field" doctrine, which is conceptually distinct from Article 254's repugnancy mechanism that the passage discusses and the question specifically asks about. Moreover, the occupied field doctrine typically operates within the Concurrent List framework where Parliament's comprehensive legislation on a Concurrent subject may preclude State legislation in that field. The passage focuses specifically on Article 254's repugnancy analysis, which requires both laws to be on Concurrent subjects, making this approach inappropriate for analyzing conflicts between Union List and State List enactments. The question asks about the applicability of the repugnancy doctrine, not whether Parliament has occupied a legislative field.

Option (d) Incorrect: While pith and substance analysis determining the State law's true character as land revenue legislation might be relevant to determining legislative competence in this scenario, this option does not directly address the specific question asked: the applicability of the repugnancy doctrine under Article 254. The passage distinguishes between competence issues (resolved by doctrines like pith and substance) and repugnancy issues (resolved by Article 254), and the fundamental point is that Article 254's repugnancy doctrine itself does not apply to conflicts between non-Concurrent subject matters. This option confuses the competence analysis that might validate the State law with the inapplicability of repugnancy doctrine, which is the core issue the question addresses.

57. Correct Answer: (a) Central law prevails when both laws cover the same field despite absence of direct contradiction.

Reference: "In *Deep Chand v. State of U.P.* (1959), when both Central and State laws covered the same field, the State law was void to the extent of conflict, and the Central law prevailed."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately applies the principle from *Deep Chand* as stated in the passage, recognizing that when both Central and State laws comprehensively cover the same regulatory field, Central law supremacy is established even without direct contradiction in every specific provision. Here, both laws operate under the same Concurrent Entry 42 and comprehensively regulate trade practices by establishing complete parallel regulatory regimes with their own dispute resolution mechanisms, limitation periods, penalty structures, and investigative procedures. The establishment of such parallel comprehensive frameworks for governing the same subject matter constitutes covering the same field, which triggers Central supremacy under Article 254(1) and makes the State law void to the extent of conflict, regardless of whether traders could theoretically comply with both.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option misapplies the principle from *Bharat Hydro Power Corporation*, which held that repugnancy does not arise when "statutes occupy different fields without encroachment," but the key constitutional requirement is that the fields must actually be different, not merely that the laws share similar objectives. Both laws here operate under the same Concurrent Entry 42 and comprehensively regulate trade practices through complete regulatory schemes, meaning they occupy the same field rather than different fields. The passage distinguishes between laws in different fields (where no repugnancy arises per *Bharat Hydro Power*) and laws covering the same field (where Central law prevails per *Deep Chand*), and this scenario falls within the latter category despite the laws having similar regulatory objectives.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly characterizes parallel comprehensive regulatory schemes as merely alternative frameworks that can coexist without conflict. While the passage notes that "alternative remedies" are insufficient for repugnancy in certain contexts, this principle applies when laws provide different avenues within a single coherent

framework without establishing competing regulatory regimes. Here, the State has created a complete parallel system with its own dispute resolution tiers, procedural timelines, penalty provisions, and investigative mechanisms governing the same trade practices already comprehensively regulated by Parliament. This goes beyond providing alternative remedies and establishes competing regulatory frameworks that cover the same field, which *Deep Chand* indicates results in Central law supremacy.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option overstates Article 254(1)'s operation by suggesting automatic invalidity of State laws without requiring demonstration of actual repugnancy or same-field coverage. While Article 254(1) establishes the principle of Central law supremacy on Concurrent subjects, the passage clarifies that courts insist on strict preconditions and require demonstration of "clear, direct, and irreconcilable" conflict before declaring repugnancy. Article 254(1) makes State law void "to the extent of repugnancy," not automatically void merely because it is enacted after a Central law on the same Concurrent subject. The constitutional framework requires analysis of whether the laws truly conflict or cover the same field, not mechanical application of temporal priority to invalidate all subsequent State legislation on Concurrent subjects.

58. Correct Answer: (b) Liability arises if readers can recognize the claimants even though they were not named explicitly.

Reference: "The doctrine of identification requires that the statement be about the claimant even without being named, so liability arises if readers can recognize the claimant, but not where only an indeterminate class is targeted unless the description pinpoints identifiable individuals."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option incorrectly applies the indeterminate class exception without considering the qualification provided in the passage. While it is true that targeting an indeterminate class generally does not give rise to liability, the passage explicitly states that liability can arise "unless the description pinpoints identifiable individuals." In this scenario, the description of characteristics matching three senior officials who are well-known in policy circles means the description has moved beyond a mere indeterminate class and has pinpointed specific identifiable individuals. The combination of specific

characteristics, limited number of possible matches, and recognition within a relevant professional network transforms what might appear to be an indeterminate class reference into specific identification, thereby satisfying the identification requirement for defamation.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately reflects the doctrine of identification as stated in the passage, which explicitly provides that "liability arises if readers can recognize the claimant" even when the claimant is not named. The passage makes clear that explicit naming is not necessary for the identification element to be satisfied; what matters is whether readers can recognize who is being referred to from the description provided. In this case, the characteristics described match three specific senior officials who are well-known in policy circles, and at least one official has evidence that colleagues identified him from the article. This demonstrates that the identification requirement is met because readers within the relevant professional network could recognize the claimants from the description, fulfilling the test for actionable defamation.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly suggests that only those who can produce direct evidence of being identified by third parties can claim defamation, thereby imposing an evidentiary burden that is not required by the identification doctrine. The passage states that "liability arises if readers can recognize the claimant," not that the claimant must prove specific instances of recognition through documentary evidence such as messages. The test is whether readers objectively can recognize the claimant from the description, not whether the claimant can produce evidence of actual recognition. While the messages received by one official provide strong evidence of identification, the other two officials can also satisfy the identification requirement by showing that the description objectively points to them as recognizable individuals within the relevant readership.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option misunderstands the relationship between the indeterminate class exception and the qualification about pinpointing identifiable individuals. The passage does not require that claimants must prove they constitute the entire indeterminate class; rather, it states that while targeting an indeterminate class generally does not create liability, liability does arise "unless the description pinpoints identifiable individuals." The focus is on whether the description, despite appearing

to target a class, actually pinpoints specific identifiable people. The three officials need not prove they are the only members of the class; they need only show that the description sufficiently pinpoints them as identifiable individuals whom readers can recognize, which the well-known characteristics and limited number of matching officials demonstrate.

59. Correct Answer: (b) Public-interest defence under s.4 succeeds because reasonable belief and verification factors are satisfied.

Reference: "The public-interest defence in s.4 applies where the defendant reasonably believes publication on a matter of public interest is justified, with factors such as seriousness, sourcing, verification and urgency guiding assessment."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option fails because the truth defence requires proving that the allegation is "substantially true," and the key allegation here, that the company "concealed this data from regulators", is demonstrably false since verification confirmed the data was disclosed to regulators. While the passage states that minor inaccuracies do not defeat the truth defence if the allegation is substantially true, the concealment allegation is not a minor detail but a core imputation affecting the company's integrity and conduct. The fact that cardiac events did occur in trials does not make the entire allegation substantially true when the central claim about concealment from regulators is false. The truth defence is complete only "if the defendant proves the allegation is substantially true, even if minor details are inaccurate," but here the inaccuracy goes to the heart of the defamatory sting.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately applies the public-interest defence which protects publication where "the defendant reasonably believes publication on a matter of public interest is justified." The passage identifies several guiding factors, seriousness, sourcing, verification, and urgency, all of which are present here. The matter concerns pharmaceutical safety (serious public interest), the newspaper spent six months verifying sources including whistleblowers and medical experts (sourcing and verification), and publication occurred when regulatory authorities announced a review (urgency and timeliness). Even though the specific allegation about concealment proved false, the defence focuses on whether the defendant reasonably believed publication was

justified based on these factors, and the extensive verification efforts and serious subject matter support a finding of reasonable belief despite the ultimate inaccuracy.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option mischaracterizes the nature of the statement as opinion when it is clearly a factual allegation. The honest-opinion defence applies to "statements presented and understood as opinion on indicated facts that a reasonable person could hold," but the newspaper's assertion that MediCorp "concealed this data from regulators" is a statement of fact, not opinion. It makes a specific factual claim about the company's conduct that is either true or false, not a subjective evaluation or commentary on known facts. The passage distinguishes between factual allegations (which require truth or public-interest defences) and opinions (which are protected by the honest-opinion defence), and this statement falls squarely into the former category, making the honest-opinion defence inapplicable regardless of whether the opinion might be reasonable.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option confuses the statutory public-interest defence in s.4 with the common law qualified privilege doctrine, which the passage distinguishes as protecting "duty- or interest-based communications provided they are not malicious." While both involve public interest considerations, qualified privilege traditionally applies to specific relationships or occasions where there is a legal, moral, or social duty to communicate information or a corresponding interest in receiving it, typically in more restricted contexts. The passage treats the s.4 public-interest defence as a distinct statutory defence with its own framework based on reasonable belief and specific guiding factors. Moreover, qualified privilege typically requires absence of malice, whereas the s.4 defence focuses on reasonable belief and the verification factors, making the statutory defence the more appropriate framework for journalistic publication on matters of public interest.

60. Correct Answer: (b)

Reference Line: "The serious-harm doctrine in s.1 of the Defamation Act 2013 demands proof that the statement has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to reputation, and for trading organisations, serious financial loss."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation: Option (a) Incorrect: The presumption that every negative statement damages reputation is inconsistent with modern defamation standards. The

law has evolved to require objective proof of serious harm and not mere subjective hurt or embarrassment. Without concrete evidence that Priya's reputation suffered real deterioration or her business declined, the legal threshold is unmet. The doctrine seeks to prevent misuse of defamation actions for trivial grievances and to preserve free expression. The Court must be satisfied that the harm was substantial and not fleeting or speculative in nature.

Option (b) Correct: The statutory test requires a claimant to establish that the publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm to her reputation. For individuals, this may involve loss of esteem or social standing; for businesses, financial loss must also be shown. Since Priya's sales and goodwill remained unaffected, her claim lacks evidence of real or probable harm. The law's purpose is to separate actionable defamation from harmless criticism. Only measurable or foreseeable damage of a serious degree satisfies the requirement, and that is absent here.

Option (c) Incorrect: The mere presence of unverified or careless allegations does not automatically result in serious harm. The Court distinguishes between falsity of a statement and its impact on reputation. Without proving that the publication had material consequences, such as customers withdrawing business or social standing declining, liability cannot attach. Defamation law now focuses on the demonstrable seriousness of injury rather than presumed moral outrage. The unverified nature of the report may be unethical, but it is not by itself legally sufficient to establish serious harm.

Option (d) Incorrect: The contention that media-originated statements cannot cause serious harm misunderstands the principle entirely. The law applies uniformly, whether the statement appears in print, broadcast, or digital form. The decisive factor is not the medium but the magnitude of the injury to reputation. If a media report causes tangible or probable loss of esteem or business, it can constitute serious harm. However, where the report has negligible or no impact, as in Priya's case, it falls short of the statutory requirement. The focus remains firmly on proof, not presumption.

61. Correct Answer: (d) Publication occurred when the statement was made known to faculty members other than Dr. Kumar.

Reference: "The doctrine of publication defines liability-creating communication as making known the defamatory matter to someone other than the claimant,

including intentional or foreseeable disclosure to a third party."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation: Option (a) Incorrect: This option misidentifies when publication occurred by focusing on when Dr. Kumar learned of the statement through colleagues' subsequent communications. The passage defines publication as "making known the defamatory matter to someone other than the claimant, including intentional or foreseeable disclosure to a third party." Publication occurred at the seminar when Professor Williams made the statement to 30 faculty members (third parties other than Dr. Kumar), not later when colleagues told Dr. Kumar about it. The subsequent communications to Dr. Kumar might constitute further publications by those colleagues, but the original publication, and the one relevant to Professor Williams's liability, occurred when she spoke to the faculty members at the seminar. Understanding when publication occurs is crucial for analyzing defamation claims.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly applies the truth defence by focusing on literal truth of a minor detail while ignoring whether the overall allegation is "substantially true." The passage provides that the truth defence succeeds "if the defendant proves the allegation is substantially true, even if minor details are inaccurate," but this principle also operates in reverse, minor true details do not validate a substantially false allegation. Professor Williams's statement alleged that Dr. Kumar "plagiarized substantial portions" of his monograph, but the evidence shows only two paragraphs in a 400-page work resembled earlier sources, meaning 95% was original. The allegation of "substantial portions" being plagiarized is not substantially true when only a minimal fraction of the work involved copying, so the truth defence would fail even though some element of plagiarism can be proved.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option prematurely concludes that qualified privilege protects the statement without considering all requirements for the defence. While the passage states that "qualified privilege shields duty- or interest-based communications provided they are not malicious," the defence is not absolute and can be defeated by malice. The passage indicates qualified privilege applies to communications made in performance of a duty or in pursuit of a legitimate interest, and an academic seminar discussing ethics might fall within this category. However, the defence requires absence of

malice, and making an exaggerated allegation (claiming "substantial portions" were plagiarized when only two paragraphs of 400 pages were problematic) could constitute malice or reckless disregard that defeats the privilege. The option incorrectly treats qualified privilege as automatically applicable without analyzing whether all conditions are satisfied.

Option (d) Correct: This accurately applies the doctrine of publication as defined in the passage, which states that publication is "making known the defamatory matter to someone other than the claimant, including intentional or foreseeable disclosure to a third party." Professor Williams made the defamatory statement to 30 faculty members at the seminar, which constitutes making it known to persons other than Dr. Kumar (the claimant). This communication to third parties satisfies the publication requirement for defamation liability. The passage emphasizes that publication occurs when the statement is communicated to someone other than the claimant, and it can be intentional (as here, where Professor Williams deliberately spoke to the assembled faculty) or foreseeable. The publication element is thus clearly established when the statement was made at the seminar.

62. Correct Answer: (a) The video constitutes libel because broadcasting qualifies as defamation by permanent communication.

Reference: "The libel-slander distinction classifies libel as defamation by permanent communication, which includes writing and broadcasting and may extend to enduring transients such as skywriting; words are unnecessary if a permanent communication conveys defamatory innuendo, and libel is also a criminal offence."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation: Option (a) Correct: This accurately applies the libel-slander distinction as stated in the passage, which explicitly provides that libel includes "writing and broadcasting." The video advertisement constitutes broadcasting within the meaning of the passage, as it is a produced audiovisual communication disseminated through social media to a wide audience. The passage makes clear that libel encompasses defamation by "permanent communication" and specifically includes "broadcasting" within this category, regardless of whether the communication involves written words or spoken words in a broadcast format. The fact that the defamatory content is

conveyed through spoken words in a video does not change its classification as libel because broadcasting is expressly identified as a form of permanent communication, and the passage notes that "words are unnecessary if a permanent communication conveys defamatory innuendo."

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly characterizes the video as slander by focusing solely on the spoken nature of the words while ignoring that the passage classifies "broadcasting" as libel. The libel-slander distinction does not turn simply on whether words are spoken versus written; rather, it turns on whether the communication is permanent or transient. While slander traditionally covers non-permanent oral communications, the passage explicitly states that libel "includes writing and broadcasting," thereby treating broadcast communications as permanent regardless of their oral nature. The video advertisement is a produced broadcast communication that has been published on social media, not a transient oral statement in conversation, so it falls within the libel category despite consisting of spoken words.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly suggests that the availability of download functionality determines whether a communication is permanent, but the passage defines libel by the nature of the communication medium rather than the technical capabilities for storage by recipients. The passage classifies "broadcasting" as libel, a permanent communication, without conditioning this on whether broadcasts can be recorded or downloaded by viewers. A television broadcast is libel even though viewers in the pre-DVR era could not save it, because broadcasting itself is treated as permanent communication. The focus is on the form of publication (broadcast) rather than the ability of recipients to create their own permanent copies, so whether viewers can download the video does not determine its classification.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option misunderstands the basis for the libel-slander distinction by suggesting that duration of availability transforms the classification. The passage indicates that classification depends on the nature of the communication medium, whether it is inherently permanent or transient, not on how long it remains accessible. The passage classifies libel as "defamation by permanent communication, which includes writing and broadcasting," treating broadcasting as inherently permanent based on the medium itself. The passage does note that libel "may extend to enduring transients such as skywriting," but this refers to communications that are ephemeral yet

leave a temporary physical trace, not to the duration of online availability. A broadcast video is libel from the moment of publication because of its nature as broadcasting, not because it stays online for three months.

63. Correct Answer: (c) Qualified privilege shields duty- or interest-based communications provided they are not malicious.

Reference: "The privilege doctrine protects certain occasions: absolute privilege covers statements in Parliament and in judicial proceedings, and qualified privilege shields duty- or interest-based communications provided they are not malicious."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option incorrectly suggests that qualified privilege provides blanket protection for all duty-based communications "regardless of subsequent dissemination," but the passage makes clear that qualified privilege is conditional and limited to specific privileged occasions. The passage states that qualified privilege "shields duty- or interest-based communications provided they are not malicious," indicating that the protection is not absolute and can be lost. Furthermore, qualified privilege typically protects communications made on occasions where there is a duty or interest justifying the communication to particular recipients; it does not extend to publication beyond the privileged occasion. The accidental forwarding to the journalist represents publication outside the privileged occasion (internal firm communications), and while this might not retroactively destroy privilege for the original communications, it certainly does not protect the publication to the journalist.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option correctly recognizes that qualified privilege can be limited to specific occasions but incorrectly suggests that forwarding the email to the executive committee moved "beyond the privileged occasion." The analyst's email to her supervisor and the supervisor's forwarding to the executive committee both occur within the same privileged occasion, internal firm communications where there is a duty to share information relevant to client advice and investment decisions. The passage indicates that qualified privilege protects "duty- or interest-based communications," and both the initial email and the forwarding to decision-makers within the firm serve the legitimate business purpose of evaluating investment recommendations. The

privileged occasion is not limited to a single communication but extends to the chain of duty-based communications within the organization necessary to act on the information. The privilege is lost with the accidental publication to the journalist, not with internal forwarding.

Option (c) Correct: This accurately states the qualified privilege doctrine as presented in the passage, which provides that "qualified privilege shields duty- or interest-based communications provided they are not malicious." The analyst's email to her supervisor constitutes a duty-based communication within the scope of her employment responsibilities regarding investment due diligence, and the supervisor's forwarding to the executive committee continues within this privileged occasion as it serves the firm's duty to evaluate recommendations for client advice. The key limitation is that the privilege protects these communications "provided they are not malicious," meaning it can be defeated if the defendant acted with malice (such as knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth). The passage distinguishes qualified privilege from absolute privilege, emphasizing that qualified privilege is conditional and requires absence of malice, making this the controlling principle for determining whether the defence applies.

Option (d) Incorrect: The passage defines qualified privilege as protecting "duty- or interest-based communications," and whether such protection applies depends on the nature of each specific communication and the occasion on which it was made. The analyst's original email to her supervisor and the supervisor's forwarding to the executive committee were both made on privileged occasions (internal duty-based communications within the firm), and the fact that an accidental subsequent publication occurred does not retroactively remove the privilege that attached to those earlier communications. However, the publication to the journalist was not made on a privileged occasion and would not be protected. Privilege is not destroyed retrospectively; rather, different publications receive different treatment based on their individual circumstances.

64. Correct Answer: (d) The admission relieves the plaintiff of proving the fact but is not conclusive on the court.

Reference: "The doctrine of waiver of proof holds that an admission relieves the other side of proving the

admitted fact, but it is not conclusive; the court may still seek corroboration or reject it partly or wholly."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option imposes a mandatory corroboration requirement that is not supported by the passage. While the passage states that the court "may still seek corroboration," it does not mandate that admissions must be corroborated to have any evidentiary value. The word "may" indicates judicial discretion rather than obligation. An admission has intrinsic evidentiary value because it is a statement against interest made by a party, and the doctrine of waiver of proof recognizes this by relieving the opposing party of the burden to prove the admitted fact. The court has the power to seek corroboration or reject the admission, but this does not mean that every admission is worthless without independent evidence, it means the court can evaluate whether corroboration is necessary based on the circumstances of each case.

Option (b) Incorrect: The passage states that an admission "relieves the other side of proving the admitted fact," which indicates that once a fact is admitted, the necessity for additional proof is waived, not that it must be supplemented by a minimum quantum of other evidence. While the court retains discretion to seek corroboration or reject the admission, this is a matter of judicial evaluation rather than a mandatory rule requiring supporting evidence. The evidentiary value of an admission flows from the party's own acknowledgment against their interest, and it does not depend on being bolstered by external witnesses or documents, though such evidence may be considered if available or if the court deems it prudent to examine.

Option (c) Incorrect: The passage explicitly states that while an admission relieves the other side of proving the admitted fact, "it is not conclusive; the court may still seek corroboration or reject it partly or wholly." The doctrine of waiver of proof operates to shift the burden away from the party benefiting from the admission, but it does not create an irrebuttable presumption or prevent the court from exercising its discretion to evaluate the admission's reliability. The court retains the power to assess the circumstances, credibility, and context of the admission, and may choose to reject it if it appears unreliable or was made under mistake, inadvertence, or other vitiating factors affecting its probative value.

Option (d) Correct: This accurately captures the doctrine of waiver of proof as stated in the passage, which provides that "an admission relieves the other side of proving the admitted fact, but it is not conclusive; the court may still seek corroboration or reject it partly or wholly." The admission operates to waive the need for the plaintiff to lead positive evidence proving the receipt of ₹5 lakhs, thereby satisfying the initial burden of proof on that fact. However, the admission does not bind the court conclusively, the court retains discretion to seek corroboration if it deems necessary or to reject the admission partially or entirely based on other evidence or circumstances. This principle balances the evidentiary value of admissions against the need for judicial scrutiny and ensures that admissions are not mechanically treated as dispositive without regard to their reliability or context.

65. Correct Answer: (d)

Reference Line: "The compromise-negotiation protection ensures that statements made in civil compromise discussions are irrelevant when made under an express or implied understanding that they will not be used in evidence."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: The mere fact that a statement may reveal factual truth does not override the procedural safeguard attached to compromise communications. The law prioritizes candour and open negotiation over evidentiary utility. Allowing parties to use such statements later in court would deter future settlements and destroy the confidentiality essential to civil mediation. Evidence law intentionally excludes these statements to encourage fair resolution without fear of later prejudice. The truth-seeking function must yield to public policy favouring compromise integrity.

Option (b) Incorrect: Although the law excludes such statements, their exclusion depends on whether they were made under an express or implied understanding of non-use. If the communication was not clearly for settlement, or if made publicly without assurance of confidentiality, it may be admissible. Here, the key factor is the condition attached to its use, not merely the context of civil proceedings. General exclusion cannot be claimed without proof of the underlying assurance. A nuanced distinction must be drawn between unconditional admissions and protected compromise statements.

Option (c) Incorrect: An admission's voluntariness does not automatically make it binding when given in settlement dialogue. The principle of fairness prevents adverse use of such admissions when made with the expectation of protection. Legal recognition of confidentiality fosters negotiation and avoids coercion through subsequent evidentiary misuse. To allow enforcement of such partial acknowledgments would penalize attempts at reconciliation. Civil procedure encourages settlement, not the tactical exploitation of failed compromise exchanges. Such statements lose evidentiary value if made within negotiation privilege. Option (d) Correct: The statement was expressly marked "for settlement purposes only," establishing both express intention and implied assurance of non-use. Once made within the boundaries of compromise negotiation, it becomes legally irrelevant as evidence in later litigation. The protection applies to all communications exchanged in good faith during attempts to settle disputes, shielding them from adversarial misuse. Admitting such a statement would violate the public policy underpinning confidentiality and chill the practice of negotiation. The Court must therefore exclude it from evidence to uphold procedural fairness and protect candour in dispute resolution.

66. Correct Answer: (c) The information distinctly relating to the fact discovered, including the location and accused's knowledge, is admissible.

Reference: "The discovery doctrine allows proof of so much of the information given by an accused in custody as distinctly relates to a fact discovered, the 'fact discovered' covering both the location of recovery and the accused's knowledge, but not the previous use or history of the object."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option correctly identifies that the statement was made to a police officer, which would generally attract the police-bar doctrine excluding confessions made to police officers. However, it fails to recognize the specific exception created by the discovery doctrine, which allows limited use of information given by an accused in custody when it leads to discovery of facts. The passage establishes that while confessions to police are generally inadmissible under the police-bar doctrine, the discovery doctrine carves out a narrow exception permitting proof of "so much of the information given by an accused in custody as distinctly relates to a fact discovered." This exception

is based on the reliability and corroboration provided by the subsequent discovery, which gives independent verification to the accused's statement. Therefore, while the statement cannot be admitted as a confession, the portion distinctly related to the discovery may be proved under the discovery doctrine. Option (b) Incorrect: This option is too restrictive and does not fully capture the scope of the discovery doctrine as explained in the passage. While it correctly recognizes that not all aspects of the statement are admissible, it incorrectly suggests that only the bare fact of recovery can be proved while excluding the accused's knowledge and the connection between the information and the discovery. The passage explicitly states that the "fact discovered" covers "both the location of recovery and the accused's knowledge," indicating that the evidentiary scope extends beyond merely proving that an object was found. The discovery doctrine permits proof of the information linking the accused to the discovered fact, including that the accused had knowledge of the location and disclosed it to the police, which is what makes the discovery significant and incriminatory. Limiting evidence to only the recovery would strip the discovery of its probative value.

Option (c) Correct: This accurately reflects the discovery doctrine as stated in the passage, which "allows proof of so much of the information given by an accused in custody as distinctly relates to a fact discovered, the 'fact discovered' covering both the location of recovery and the accused's knowledge." The accused's statement about hiding the knife under the banyan tree near the railway station distinctly relates to the discovery of the knife at that location. The prosecution can prove that the accused disclosed this specific location, that police went there based on the information, that the knife was recovered from that exact spot, and that the accused had knowledge of the knife's location, these elements collectively constitute the "fact discovered" under the doctrine. However, the passage also clarifies that the discovery does not extend to "the previous use or history of the object," meaning any statements about how the accused used the knife or what he did with it earlier cannot be proved under this doctrine.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option goes too far in suggesting that the entire statement is admissible merely because it led to discovery of material evidence. The discovery doctrine creates only a limited exception to the police-bar doctrine, not a wholesale admission of

the accused's statement. The passage specifies that only "so much of the information given by an accused in custody as distinctly relates to a fact discovered" may be proved, which restricts the admissible portion to what is directly connected to the discovery itself. Any confession or admission beyond the specific information about the location and the accused's knowledge remains excluded by the police-bar doctrine. For instance, if the accused had also said "I used it to kill the victim" or "I bought it two days before the incident," these portions about the previous use or history of the knife would not be admissible even though they are part of the same statement that led to the discovery.

67. Correct Answer: (a) The retracted confession requires corroboration and cannot alone support conviction unless the court is convinced of its truth.

Reference: "The retracted-confession doctrine warns that a conviction should not rest solely on a retracted confession unless the court is convinced of its truth and voluntariness, usually requiring corroboration."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately reflects the retracted-confession doctrine as stated in the passage, which "warns that a conviction should not rest solely on a retracted confession unless the court is convinced of its truth and voluntariness, usually requiring corroboration." The doctrine establishes a two-fold test: first, the court must be independently convinced of the confession's truth and voluntariness despite the retraction; second, corroboration is usually required, meaning the prosecution should provide some independent evidence supporting the confession's reliability or the facts admitted therein. In this case, the prosecution has not produced documentary evidence of accounting manipulation or witnesses to establish embezzlement, which means there is no corroboration. The court must therefore scrutinize the confession with great care and determine whether, notwithstanding the lack of corroboration, it is convinced of the confession's truth and voluntariness, a high threshold when the accused has provided an explanation for the retraction (mental stress and police pressure).

Option (b) Incorrect: This option goes to the opposite extreme by treating the retraction as rendering the confession "worthless," which is equally unsupported by the passage. The retracted-confession doctrine does

not hold that retracted confessions have no evidentiary value; rather, it establishes that they must be approached with caution and should not be the sole basis for conviction unless the court is convinced of their truth and voluntariness, usually with corroboration. The word "warns" in the passage indicates a cautionary approach, not an absolute rule prohibiting reliance. A retracted confession can still support a conviction if the court, after careful scrutiny, finds it credible and voluntary despite the retraction, and especially if there is corroborating evidence. The doctrine recognizes that some retractions may be false or tactical attempts to escape liability, so it does not automatically strip retracted confessions of all value, it merely requires enhanced judicial scrutiny and, typically, supporting evidence before they can be relied upon.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option treats retraction as automatically rendering the confession inadmissible, but the passage does not support such an absolute rule. The retracted-confession doctrine recognizes that a confession remains in evidence even after retraction, what changes is the weight and reliance the court can place on it. A retracted confession is not inadmissible; rather, it is treated with great caution because the retraction raises doubts about its voluntariness or truthfulness. The passage indicates that courts should be wary of basing a conviction "solely on a retracted confession," which implies that such confessions can still be considered but require careful scrutiny. If retraction automatically made confessions inadmissible, there would be no need for the doctrine to guide courts on when and how they may be relied upon; the mere fact that the passage addresses the evidentiary treatment of retracted confessions confirms they remain admissible but require enhanced scrutiny.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option suggests that proper recording by the Magistrate is sufficient to base a conviction on a retracted confession, but this ignores the core warning of the retracted-confession doctrine. While recording before a Magistrate addresses one aspect of voluntariness (ensuring the confession was not made in police custody under the custody-bar doctrine), it does not automatically establish that the confession is truthful or that the accused was not under other pressures when making it. The passage specifically states that "a conviction should not rest solely on a retracted confession unless the court is convinced of its truth and voluntariness," indicating that even properly recorded confessions require the

court to be independently satisfied of their reliability when they have been retracted. The procedural safeguard of Magistrate recording is necessary but not sufficient; the retraction triggers a substantive inquiry into whether the confession can be trusted as the sole basis for conviction.

68. Correct Answer: (b) The statement is admissible because admissions constitute an exception to the hearsay rule as best evidence against the maker.

Reference: "The hearsay-exception doctrine accepts that, though technically hearsay, admissions are received as the best evidence against the party making them."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option incorrectly restricts the proof of admissions to documentary form only, but the passage defines an admission as "any oral, documentary, or electronic statement suggesting an inference about a fact in issue or a relevant fact," indicating that admissions can be made and proved in various forms including oral statements. The hearsay-exception doctrine recognizes admissions as an exception to the hearsay rule regardless of whether they are oral or written. If admissions could only be proved through documents, the passage would not have identified "oral" as one of the forms an admission can take. The witness's testimony about what the accused told him is competent evidence to prove the oral admission, provided the usual requirements for witness testimony are met. The mode of proving an admission depends on how it was made, oral admissions are proved through witness testimony, written admissions through documents.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately applies the hearsay-exception doctrine as stated in the passage, which "accepts that, though technically hearsay, admissions are received as the best evidence against the party making them." The accused's statement to the witness acknowledging that he hit the victim is an admission of a fact relevant to the assault charge. Although the witness is testifying about what the accused said (making it technically hearsay), the law recognizes admissions as a well-established exception to the hearsay rule on the theory that statements against one's interest are inherently reliable and that a party should be bound by their own statements. The passage explicitly characterizes such statements as "the best evidence against the party making them," justifying their reception despite the general prohibition against

hearsay. Therefore, the witness can testify about the accused's admission, and it is admissible evidence against the accused in the trial.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option imposes a requirement that the accused be called to confirm making the statement, but this contradicts the fundamental nature of the hearsay exception for admissions. If the accused had to confirm the admission for it to be proved, there would be no practical exception to the hearsay rule, as the accused could simply deny making the statement or refuse to testify. The passage states that admissions are "received as the best evidence against the party making them," which contemplates that they can be proved through witnesses who heard or saw the admission, without requiring confirmation from the maker. Indeed, the passage specifically addresses that admissions are "provable only against the person who made them," which means they can be used as evidence against that person, not that the person must confirm them. The prosecution proves the admission through witness testimony about what the accused said, and it is then for the accused to challenge its accuracy or context if desired.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option conflates the requirements for confessions with those for ordinary admissions. The voluntariness doctrine discussed in the passage applies specifically to confessions, stating that "any confession irrelevant if obtained by inducement, threat, or promise from a person in authority." However, the statement in question is an admission rather than a confession in the technical sense, it was made to a private individual (a witness) one week after the incident, not to a person in authority during investigation. The passage distinguishes between admissions generally and confessions specifically, with the voluntariness requirement applying to the latter category. Ordinary admissions do not require proof of voluntariness in the same way confessions do, though they may be excluded if obtained through fraud, coercion, or other vitiating factors. The witness need not establish voluntariness to make the admission admissible, though the defence may challenge the admission's reliability on other grounds.

69. Correct Answer: (d) The confession must be taken as a complete narrative and inculpatory portions cannot be accepted while ignoring exculpatory parts.

Reference: "The whole-statement doctrine mandates that a confession be taken as a complete narrative, courts cannot accept inculpatory parts while ignoring exculpatory portions."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option improperly bifurcates the confession by allowing the prosecution to introduce the inculpatory portion as its evidence while placing the burden on the defence to "separately prove" the exculpatory explanation, but this contradicts the whole-statement doctrine. The passage mandates that the confession be taken "as a complete narrative," which means it is admitted or excluded as a unified statement, not divided into parts with different parties responsible for proving different portions. Once a confession is admitted, both its inculpatory and exculpatory elements are in evidence as part of the accused's statement, and the accused does not bear a burden to "prove" the exculpatory parts, they are already part of the evidence through the confession itself. The court evaluates the entire confession and determines what weight to give each aspect, but this is fundamentally different from requiring the defence to separately establish the truth of exculpatory portions after the prosecution has introduced only inculpatory portions.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly suggests that the Magistrate's recording process involves screening or filtering portions of the confession based on relevance to the charged offence, but the Magistrate's role is to faithfully record the accused's complete statement, not to edit it. The whole-statement doctrine operates at the trial stage when the confession is sought to be introduced as evidence, it mandates that the confession be treated as a complete narrative in which inculpatory and exculpatory portions cannot be separated. The Magistrate is required to record whatever statement the accused makes, and relevance determinations are for the trial court. Moreover, the passage indicates that the issue is not relevance (both the admission of forgery and the explanation about belief in entitlement are relevant to the accused's guilt and mental state) but rather whether inculpatory portions can be cherry-picked while excluding exculpatory context, which the whole-statement doctrine prohibits regardless of what the Magistrate recorded or how the portions relate to the charge.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option allows the prosecution to cherry-pick favorable portions of a confession while excluding explanations or qualifications that might benefit the accused, but this approach violates the whole-statement doctrine. The passage explicitly mandates that "a confession be taken as a complete narrative" and prohibits courts from accepting "inculpatory parts while ignoring exculpatory portions." This rule exists to ensure fairness and prevent distortion of the accused's statement, a confession often contains both admissions of conduct and explanations, justifications, or qualifications that provide context. Allowing selective use would enable the prosecution to present a misleading picture by extracting damaging admissions while suppressing the accused's accompanying explanations. The doctrine does not permit the court to assess credibility of different portions separately and admit only those it finds believable; rather, it requires the entire statement to be considered as an integrated whole, and the court then evaluates its overall probative value and credibility.

Option (d) Correct: This accurately reflects the whole-statement doctrine as stated in the passage, which "mandates that a confession be taken as a complete narrative, courts cannot accept inculpatory parts while ignoring exculpatory portions." The accused's confession contains both an admission of forging documents and selling land multiple times (inculpatory) and an explanation of his belief that he had a legitimate claim based on the original owner's verbal agreement (exculpatory or mitigating). The doctrine requires that both aspects be considered together as part of the same narrative. The court cannot accept the admission of forgery while ignoring the accused's explanation about his mental state and belief in entitlement, as this would distort the complete picture the accused sought to present. The court must evaluate the confession in its entirety and give appropriate weight to both the inculpatory and exculpatory elements, ultimately determining what probative value the complete statement has in light of all other evidence.

70. Correct Answer: (b) The artisan bakery can pursue passing off without registration by proving goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage.

Reference: "The registration requirement principle separates the actions because a registered trademark is necessary to launch an infringement claim, whereas passing off proceeds without registration and thus

shields marks and goodwill even when the owner has not registered the mark."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option incorrectly universalizes the registration requirement to all legal actions concerning brand names, but the passage clearly distinguishes between two distinct regimes, trademark infringement (which requires registration) and passing off (which does not). The registration requirement principle specifically "separates the actions" by making registration necessary only for infringement claims, not for all brand-related legal actions. The passage explicitly states that "passing off proceeds without registration and thus shields marks and goodwill even when the owner has not registered the mark," confirming that registration is not mandatory for all legal remedies. The common law tort of passing off exists precisely to protect businesses that have built goodwill and reputation but have not secured statutory registration, ensuring that unregistered marks are not left entirely without legal protection against misappropriation.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately reflects the registration requirement principle as stated in the passage, which provides that "passing off proceeds without registration and thus shields marks and goodwill even when the owner has not registered the mark." The artisan bakery, despite lacking trademark registration, can invoke the passing off doctrine by establishing the goodwill-misrepresentation-damage triad. The passage defines passing off as protecting "the goodwill of a business without requiring registration," and it is "engaged when one party misrepresents its goods or services as those of another, leading to consumer confusion and injury to reputation, sales, or brand identity." The artisan bakery's fifteen-year operation, substantial reputation, customer loyalty, the chain's similar branding causing customer confusion, and the 40% sales decline provide factual basis for proving all three elements of passing off, making this remedy available despite the absence of registration.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly imposes a mandatory registration requirement before initiating any legal proceedings, but the passage explicitly recognizes passing off as an independent cause of action that "proceeds without registration." While it is true that trademark infringement requires registration as a prerequisite, the passage establishes two parallel regimes, the statutory infringement action (requiring registration) and the common law passing off action

(not requiring registration). The registration requirement principle "separates the actions" precisely to accommodate situations where a business has built goodwill without formal registration. Requiring the artisan bakery to obtain registration before pursuing legal remedy would nullify the purpose of the passing off doctrine and leave businesses vulnerable during the registration process or when they have relied on common law protection. The passage confirms that passing off "shields marks and goodwill even when the owner has not registered the mark."

Option (d) Incorrect: This option incorrectly treats trademark registration as conferring absolute protection that defeats all competing claims, but this misunderstands the relationship between registration and prior rights. While registration provides statutory protection under the infringement regime, it does not automatically override pre-existing goodwill and reputation established through actual use in commerce. The passing off doctrine exists as a common law remedy that can operate even against registered marks where the claimant can prove prior goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The passage indicates that both infringement and passing off are "distinct regimes" that "protect brand identity, reputation, and consumer confidence through different foundations," suggesting they can operate independently and, in some cases, a registered mark may still face passing off claims if it appropriates another's prior goodwill. Registration provides statutory rights but does not extinguish common law rights based on prior use and established goodwill in the marketplace.

71. Correct Answer: (b) The likelihood of confusion test evaluates mark similarity, business closeness, and trade channels to determine probable confusion.

Reference: "The likelihood of confusion test functions as the operative standard for infringement by evaluating similarity of the marks, closeness of the businesses or enterprises, the weakness of the defendant's mark, and the channels of trade, and it delineates when consumer confusion about origin is probable."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option imposes an overly stringent evidentiary requirement by demanding documented actual confusion through customer testimony, but the passage establishes that the standard is "likelihood of confusion," not proof of actual

confusion. The likelihood of confusion test "delineates when consumer confusion about origin is probable," indicating that probability or likelihood suffices rather than requiring concrete instances. While evidence of actual confusion strengthens a case, the passage frames the test as evaluating whether confusion is likely to occur based on factors such as mark similarity, business closeness, and trade channels, not whether it has definitively occurred and been documented. Requiring direct customer testimony would make infringement difficult to prove in many cases where confusion is likely but individual consumers have not come forward, and it would fail to prevent confusion before it becomes widespread, which is a key preventive purpose of trademark law.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately reflects the likelihood of confusion test as stated in the passage, which "functions as the operative standard for infringement by evaluating similarity of the marks, closeness of the businesses or enterprises, the weakness of the defendant's mark, and the channels of trade." The pharmaceutical company's case presents strong evidence across these factors: the marks "MediHeal" and "MediHeel" are phonetically nearly identical (mark similarity), both products are pain relief medications targeting the same consumers (business closeness and weakness), and they are sold through the same pharmacy chains (channels of trade). The documented instances of pharmacists nearly dispensing the wrong medication provide concrete evidence that confusion is probable. The test does not require proof of actual widespread consumer confusion but rather evaluates whether, based on these multi-factorial circumstances, confusion about the origin of the goods is likely to occur in the marketplace.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option creates an absolute rule that spelling differences automatically prevent infringement, but the passage indicates that the likelihood of confusion test involves a multifactorial analysis that cannot be reduced to a single bright-line rule about spelling. The test evaluates "similarity of the marks," which encompasses not just exact identity but also visual, phonetic, and conceptual similarities that might cause confusion. In this case, "MediHeal" and "MediHeel" are phonetically nearly identical despite the spelling difference, and when combined with similar packaging, color schemes, font styles, and sale through the same channels, the overall impression may be confusingly similar. The passage emphasizes that the test examines multiple factors, mark similarity,

business closeness, mark weakness, and trade channels, to determine "when consumer confusion about origin is probable," indicating that no single factor is dispositive and that the inquiry is holistic rather than mechanical.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option incorrectly imposes a subjective intent requirement for infringement, but the passage frames trademark infringement as focused on objective likelihood of confusion rather than the defendant's mental state. The passage states that infringement is actionable "where the core concern is a risk that consumers will be confused about the source of goods or services," making consumer confusion the central issue rather than the infringer's intent. While evidence of intentional copying may be relevant circumstantially to support the likelihood of confusion (suggesting the defendant believed the similarity would be effective), it is not a required element of the infringement claim. The statutory construct treats "unauthorized use of a mark identical or similar to a registered mark" as actionable based on the objective likelihood of confusion test, which evaluates marketplace factors without requiring proof of fraudulent intent or bad faith on the part of the defendant.

72. Correct Answer: (a) Infringement remedies include injunctions, monetary damages, and an award of the infringer's profits under statute.

Reference: "The remedies principle distinguishes that infringement, regulated under statute, may yield injunctions, monetary damages, and an award of the infringer's profits, while passing off supports injunctions, compensatory damages, removal of the infringing mark, and an account of profits, with relief framed as compensatory under section 20 of the CPC, 1908."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately reflects the remedies principle as stated in the passage, which provides that "infringement, regulated under statute, may yield injunctions, monetary damages, and an award of the infringer's profits." The watchmaker is entitled to seek all three forms of relief under the statutory infringement regime: an injunction to prevent continued use of the confusingly similar mark, monetary damages to compensate for losses suffered including harm to reputation and lost sales, and an account of profits that the competitor earned from the infringing activity. The passage confirms that these

remedies are available under the infringement framework, though it distinguishes the specific forms of relief available under infringement versus passing off. While the passage mentions "removal of the infringing mark" specifically in the context of passing off remedies, the injunction and account of profits available in infringement would effectively accomplish the same objectives of stopping future infringement and recovering ill-gotten gains.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option artificially restricts infringement remedies to injunctive relief alone and incorrectly suggests that monetary remedies are available only through a separate passing off claim, but the passage clearly states that infringement "may yield injunctions, monetary damages, and an award of the infringer's profits." The remedies principle distinguishes between the two regimes not by limiting infringement to injunctive relief, but by noting the specific forms of monetary and equitable relief available under each. Trademark infringement, being "regulated under statute," provides a comprehensive remedial framework including both equitable relief (injunctions) and monetary relief (damages and profits), without requiring the plaintiff to pursue a separate passing off claim. The statutory regime is designed to provide complete relief within a single cause of action, making it unnecessary to bifurcate remedies between infringement and passing off when a valid registered trademark has been infringed.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly limits remedies to compensatory damages and imposes a condition that injunctive relief must be denied if infringement was unintentional, but the passage indicates that infringement remedies "may yield injunctions, monetary damages, and an award of the infringer's profits" without conditioning injunctive relief on proof of intent. Trademark infringement is primarily concerned with likelihood of confusion and protection of consumers and trademark owners, not with the subjective intent of the infringer. Injunctive relief is a standard remedy in infringement cases because it prevents ongoing and future harm to the trademark owner and consumer confusion in the marketplace. The passage frames infringement liability based on the objective likelihood of confusion test, which does not require intent, and similarly, the remedies principle does not condition the availability of injunctions on the infringer's mental state. Intent may be relevant to the scope or extent of monetary remedies but does not preclude injunctive relief.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option imposes a malicious intent requirement for the availability of remedies including delivery up, but the passage does not condition the remedies on proof of malice or bad faith. The remedies principle states that infringement "may yield injunctions, monetary damages, and an award of the infringer's profits" without requiring proof of malicious intent for any of these remedies. While the passage mentions "removal of the infringing mark" specifically in the context of passing off (not infringement), it does not condition this or other remedies on proof of malice. The statutory infringement regime, being focused on consumer confusion and trademark protection, provides remedies based on the finding of infringement and the need to prevent continued confusion and compensate harm, not on the defendant's subjective wrongfulness. Enhanced remedies or punitive damages might require malice in some jurisdictions, but the basic remedial framework of injunctions, damages, and accounting for profits is available upon proof of infringement regardless of intent.

73. Correct Answer: (d) Infringement requires proving exclusive title and confusion likelihood, while passing off demands descriptive market perception evidence. Reference: "The burden of proof principle highlights that infringement pleadings typically assert exclusive title to a valid trademark and a likelihood of consumer confusion, while passing off demands proof of goodwill, misrepresentation, and consequential losses through a more descriptive examination of market perception."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option oversimplifies the infringement requirements by suggesting that "only registration proof" is needed, but the passage makes clear that infringement pleadings must assert both "exclusive title to a valid trademark and a likelihood of consumer confusion." While registration establishes exclusive title, the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's use creates a likelihood of confusion, which the passage identifies through the likelihood of confusion test that "evaluates similarity of the marks, closeness of the businesses or enterprises, the weakness of the defendant's mark, and the channels of trade." The infringement claim thus requires proof beyond mere registration, it requires demonstrating that the defendant's mark is sufficiently similar and used in circumstances that create probable consumer

confusion. While this is indeed less elaborate than the "more descriptive examination of market perception" required for passing off, it is not limited to registration proof alone.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly equates the burden of proof for both claims by focusing solely on the common element of consumer confusion, but the passage establishes that the evidentiary frameworks differ significantly despite both involving confusion concepts. The burden of proof principle specifically "highlights" the differences: infringement focuses on "exclusive title to a valid trademark and a likelihood of consumer confusion," making registration and probable confusion the central issues, while passing off "demands proof of goodwill, misrepresentation, and consequential losses through a more descriptive examination of market perception." Although both involve confusion (infringement addresses "likelihood of consumer confusion" and passing off addresses "misleading impression that confuses origin"), the overall proof structures differ, infringement is more streamlined and registration-focused, while passing off requires comprehensive factual proof of the goodwill-misrepresentation-damage triad including detailed market evidence, making the burdens distinctly different in scope and nature.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly suggests that both claims require identical proof with no procedural differences, but the passage explicitly establishes distinct evidentiary frameworks for infringement and passing off. The burden of proof principle "highlights" that these actions have different requirements: infringement centers on "exclusive title to a valid trademark and a likelihood of consumer confusion," while passing off requires "proof of goodwill, misrepresentation, and consequential losses through a more descriptive examination of market perception." The infringement claim, being statutory and based on registered rights, has a more streamlined proof structure focused on registration and confusion, whereas passing off, being a common law tort protecting unregistered goodwill, requires more extensive factual development about market reputation, consumer perception, and the nature of deception. The passage distinguishes the evidentiary approaches as a key difference between these "distinct regimes."

Option (d) Correct: This accurately reflects the burden of proof principle as stated in the passage, which

"highlights that infringement pleadings typically assert exclusive title to a valid trademark and a likelihood of consumer confusion, while passing off demands proof of goodwill, misrepresentation, and consequential losses through a more descriptive examination of market perception." The software company's infringement pleading properly asserts the two core requirements, valid registration of "TechSolve" (exclusive title) and likelihood of confusion from the competitor's "TechSolver" mark. In contrast, the passing off claim requires the more elaborate evidentiary showing that the company has provided: extensive evidence of reputation and goodwill (ten years of operation, customer testimonials, market surveys), proof of misrepresentation (competitor's similar branding creating misleading impressions about source), and proof of damage (financial statements showing decreased sales and market share). The "descriptive examination of market perception" is reflected in the market surveys and customer testimonials establishing how consumers perceive and recognize the brand.

74. Correct Answer: (a) The statutory infringement principle requires registration and confusing similarity based on unauthorized use of identical or similar marks.

Reference: "The trademark infringement principle is a statutory construct that treats unauthorized use of a mark identical or similar to a registered mark as actionable where the core concern is a risk that consumers will be confused about the source of goods or services, and it relies on Section 29(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 to ground protection in registration and confusing similarity."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately reflects the trademark infringement principle as stated in the passage, which "is a statutory construct that treats unauthorized use of a mark identical or similar to a registered mark as actionable where the core concern is a risk that consumers will be confused about the source of goods or services, and it relies on Section 29(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 to ground protection in registration and confusing similarity." The restaurant chain's infringement claim properly invokes Section 29(1) and is founded on two elements: its registered trademark "Spice Palace" (registration element) and the startup's unauthorized use of "Spice Palace Express," which is similar to the registered mark

(confusing similarity element). The "core concern is a risk that consumers will be confused about the source," and even though one provides dine-in services while the other provides delivery, both involve food services bearing the "Spice Palace" name, creating potential confusion about whether they share common ownership, licensing, or authorization, which is precisely the type of source confusion that infringement law addresses.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option creates an overly rigid requirement that marks must be identical and services must be identical for infringement to occur, but the passage explicitly states that infringement covers "unauthorized use of a mark identical or similar to a registered mark," indicating that similarity suffices and exact identity is not required. The statutory construct recognizes that consumer confusion can arise not only from identical marks but also from similar marks that create a risk of confusion about source. The addition of "Express" to "Spice Palace" creates a mark that is similar to the registered mark "Spice Palace," incorporating the entirety of the original mark with only a descriptive suffix. The passage frames infringement as concerning "a risk that consumers will be confused about the source of goods or services," which can occur even when marks are similar rather than identical, and the use of the complete registered mark "Spice Palace" within "Spice Palace Express" presents a strong case of similarity that could cause confusion about whether the delivery service is associated with or authorized by the restaurant chain.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option imposes an overly narrow "exact same commercial category" requirement that is not supported by the passage's description of the infringement principle. The passage states that infringement is actionable "where the core concern is a risk that consumers will be confused about the source of goods or services," without limiting this to identical commercial categories. The likelihood of confusion test, which "functions as the operative standard for infringement," includes evaluation of "closeness of the businesses or enterprises," indicating that exact identity of business type is not required, rather, the question is whether the businesses are close enough that consumers might be confused about their relationship or common source. Food delivery and restaurant dining services are related sectors both involving provision of food to consumers, and the use of a similar mark in related sectors can create confusion about whether the businesses are connected, affiliated, or authorized by the same source, which

suffices for infringement regardless of whether they are in the "exact same" category.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option incorrectly identifies passing off as the foundation for infringement claims regarding registered marks, but the passage clearly distinguishes infringement as a "statutory construct" based on Section 29(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999, while passing off is identified as a "common law tort." The passage emphasizes that "trademark infringement and passing off are distinct regimes" with "different foundations", infringement is grounded in statute and registration, while passing off is grounded in common law and goodwill protection. The infringement claim regarding the registered mark "Spice Palace" must be founded on the statutory infringement principle and Section 29(1), not on common law passing off. While the restaurant chain could potentially pursue both infringement (based on its registration) and passing off (based on its goodwill) as alternative or cumulative claims, the foundation for the infringement cause of action is specifically the statutory framework, not common law passing off, and the passage explicitly states that infringement "relies on Section 29(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 to ground protection in registration and confusing similarity."

75. Correct Answer: (a) The false representation principle applies as the product is marketed as originating from Pochampally without meeting requirements.

Reference: "The false representation of origin principle explains that GI infringement occurs when a product is marketed as coming from a geographical area without fulfilling qualifying requirements or even being from that area, because applying a GI name or symbol to unrelated goods deceives consumers and harms the product's reputation."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately applies the false representation of origin principle as stated in the passage, which explains that "GI infringement occurs when a product is marketed as coming from a geographical area without fulfilling qualifying requirements or even being from that area." The merchant is explicitly marketing Gujarat-made machine-printed fabric as "Pochampally Ikat," which is a registered GI specifically identifying handloom fabrics from Pochampally, Telangana. The fabric neither originates from Pochampally nor fulfills the

qualifying requirements of traditional tie-dye resist weaving technique associated with authentic Ikat. The passage emphasizes that "applying a GI name or symbol to unrelated goods deceives consumers and harms the product's reputation," which precisely describes the merchant's conduct of applying the "Pochampally Ikat" name to Gujarat-made machine-printed fabric that has no connection to the protected geographical region or traditional production methods, thereby deceiving consumers and potentially harming the reputation of genuine Pochampally Ikat.

Option (b) Incorrect: The merchant is not using a name that is merely similar to "Pochampally Ikat", he is using the exact GI name itself. The deceptively similar marks principle contemplates variations or derivatives of the GI name that create confusion through similarity rather than identity, such as hypothetical examples like "Pochampally-Style Ikat" or "Pochampalli Ikat" with altered spelling. In this scenario, since the merchant uses the precise registered GI name without any modification or variation, the false representation principle is more directly applicable than the deceptively similar marks principle. The distinction matters because the false representation principle addresses exact use of GI names on non-qualifying products, while deceptively similar marks addresses near-identical variations.

Option (c) Incorrect: While the passing off doctrine is relevant to GI protection and the passage states it "applies where a seller employs a GI name or symbol, including look-alike packaging, so as to confuse or deceive consumers into believing the product is genuine," the primary violation here is the false representation of geographic origin rather than merely the use of confusing packaging. The passing off doctrine is a supplementary mechanism that captures conduct creating consumer confusion through various means including packaging, whereas the false representation principle directly addresses the core problem of marketing products as originating from a protected geographical area when they do not. Although the merchant's use of traditional loom imagery in packaging could support a passing off claim as an additional ground, the fundamental infringement is the false claim that the fabric is "Pochampally Ikat" when it originates from Gujarat and lacks the traditional production characteristics, making false representation the more precise primary principle.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option invokes the non-qualifying use principle, which the passage describes

as "covers applying GI names to goods that do not meet prescribed standards or originate outside the relevant area." While this principle is related and the merchant's fabric indeed does not meet the handloom weaving standards, the non-qualifying use principle as described in the passage focuses more on products that may have some connection to the region but fail to meet quality or production standards, or on products from outside the region entirely. The false representation principle is the broader and more fundamental principle that encompasses both the geographic misrepresentation and the failure to meet requirements. The passage specifically states that false representation occurs "when a product is marketed as coming from a geographical area without fulfilling qualifying requirements or even being from that area," which covers both aspects comprehensively, whereas non-qualifying use is presented as a more specific subset addressing standards compliance and geographic origin separately.

76. Correct Answer: (b) Civil remedies include injunctions, damages for economic loss and reputation harm, and delivery up for destruction.

Reference: "Civil-remedies doctrine furnishes injunctions to halt infringing sales or distribution, damages or compensation for economic loss including loss of reputation and consumer confusion, delivery up of infringing goods for disposal or destruction under Section 22 of the 1999 Act, and declaratory relief that the goods do not comply with GI criteria."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option incorrectly limits GI remedies to injunctive relief alone, but the passage explicitly establishes that the civil-remedies doctrine "furnishes injunctions to halt infringing sales or distribution, damages or compensation for economic loss including loss of reputation and consumer confusion, delivery up of infringing goods for disposal or destruction under Section 22 of the 1999 Act, and declaratory relief." The comprehensive civil remedial framework includes multiple forms of relief beyond mere injunctions. The passage makes clear that damages or compensation are available for "economic loss including loss of reputation and consumer confusion," which directly addresses the trade association's claim for recovering economic losses. Additionally, the specific statutory provision for "delivery up of infringing goods for disposal or destruction under Section 22 of the 1999 Act"

addresses the association's request for destroying the infringing packaging. The civil-remedies doctrine thus provides a complete remedial toolkit encompassing equitable, monetary, and destructive relief, not just injunctive relief alone.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately reflects the civil-remedies doctrine as stated in the passage, which "furnishes injunctions to halt infringing sales or distribution, damages or compensation for economic loss including loss of reputation and consumer confusion, delivery up of infringing goods for disposal or destruction under Section 22 of the 1999 Act, and declaratory relief that the goods do not comply with GI criteria." The trade association's suit seeking to stop the company's sales (injunction), recover economic losses (damages for economic loss and reputation harm), and destroy infringing packaging (delivery up for destruction) encompasses three of the four civil remedies explicitly enumerated in the passage. The passage confirms that damages extend to "loss of reputation and consumer confusion," which addresses the harm suffered by genuine Bengali sweet makers when inferior products are falsely marketed as authentic Bengali rasgullas, thereby damaging the collective reputation of the protected GI and causing economic losses through market confusion and diverted sales.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly characterizes criminal penalties as the "exclusive remedy" for GI infringement, but the passage establishes parallel civil and criminal frameworks. While the criminal-enforcement doctrine does "provide penalties under Section 66 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 extending to GIs, including fines up to ₹2 lakh and/or imprisonment up to three years," the passage presents this as complementary to, not exclusive of, civil remedies. The civil-remedies doctrine is presented as a distinct framework furnishing injunctions, damages, delivery up, and declaratory relief, which are remedies sought by private parties through civil suits. Criminal prosecution is an additional enforcement mechanism typically initiated by the state, and the passage's structure, presenting civil remedies and criminal enforcement as separate doctrines, confirms they are alternative or cumulative options rather than criminal being the exclusive remedy. Trade associations typically pursue civil remedies as the primary mechanism for protecting GI rights, with criminal prosecution serving as a supplementary deterrent for serious violations.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option incorrectly elevates declaratory relief as the "primary remedy" and conditions injunctions on proof of actual consumer confusion, but the passage lists declaratory relief as one of four equal civil remedies without establishing any hierarchy or primacy. The civil-remedies doctrine presents injunctions, damages, delivery up, and declaratory relief as coordinate remedies available under the framework. Furthermore, the passage does not require proof of "actual consumer confusion" as a prerequisite for injunctive relief, instead, it indicates that the passing off doctrine "extends to situations where the plaintiff is likely to suffer damage from false representation, with damage otherwise assumed when deception is likely," suggesting that likelihood of confusion or deception suffices without requiring proof of actual instances. Injunctions are standard equitable relief in GI infringement cases to prevent ongoing and future harm, and they are not conditioned on proving actual confusion having occurred, particularly where false representation and misuse of protected names create inherent likelihood of consumer deception.

77. Correct Answer: (c) Non-qualifying use principle applies as the rice does not originate from prescribed Basmati-growing regions and lacks characteristics.

Reference: "The non-qualifying use principle covers applying GI names to goods that do not meet prescribed standards or originate outside the relevant area, for example selling rice as 'Basmati' when not grown in the specified regions of Haryana, Punjab, or Uttarakakh."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: While the misuse of name and symbols principle is relevant and the passage states it "addresses the use of a GI's name or trademark on non-genuine goods," this principle is presented as focused on the trademark or name aspect of the violation, placing a protected GI name on products that are not genuine. However, the non-qualifying use principle is more precise for this scenario because it specifically addresses both the geographic origin requirement and the quality/characteristic standards, as evidenced by the passage's explicit Basmati rice example. The misuse of name principle captures the act of using the protected name, but the non-qualifying use principle provides the more complete framework by addressing both the fact that the rice "does not originate from

prescribed Basmati-growing regions" and that it "lacks characteristics" (distinctive aroma, texture), making it the more comprehensive and precise principle. While both principles are technically applicable, non-qualifying use is specifically tailored to situations involving geographic origin requirements and prescribed standards.

Option (b) Incorrect: The false representation of origin principle, which "explains that GI infringement occurs when a product is marketed as coming from a geographical area without fulfilling qualifying requirements or even being from that area," is certainly relevant to this scenario. However, the non-qualifying use principle is more precisely applicable because it specifically "covers applying GI names to goods that do not meet prescribed standards or originate outside the relevant area," and the passage uses Basmati rice as its illustrative example, stating "for example selling rice as 'Basmati' when not grown in the specified regions of Haryana, Punjab, or Uttarakakh." The fact that the passage specifically invokes Basmati rice to exemplify the non-qualifying use principle indicates this is the most precise principle for the scenario. While false representation addresses the marketing and geographic claim aspects, non-qualifying use comprehensively addresses both the failure to originate from the prescribed area and the failure to meet prescribed standards (aroma, texture, characteristics), making it the more specific and applicable principle.

Option (c) Correct: This accurately applies the non-qualifying use principle as stated in the passage, which "covers applying GI names to goods that do not meet prescribed standards or originate outside the relevant area, for example selling rice as 'Basmati' when not grown in the specified regions of Haryana, Punjab, or Uttarakakh." The scenario directly parallels the passage's own Basmati rice example: the mill is selling rice labeled as "Basmati" when the rice (1) does not originate from any of the prescribed Basmati-growing regions (the rice comes from Bihar and Karnataka, not from Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Delhi, or Jammu & Kashmir), and (2) does not meet the prescribed standards (lacking distinctive aroma, texture, and characteristics of authentic Basmati). The non-qualifying use principle is specifically designed to address violations where the product fails both the geographic origin test and the quality/characteristic standards test, making it the most precise characterization of this violation.

Option (d) Incorrect: While the passing off doctrine is applicable to GI protection and the passage states it "applies where a seller employs a GI name or symbol, including look-alike packaging, so as to confuse or deceive consumers into believing the product is genuine," focusing on the Punjab farm imagery aspect makes this analysis incomplete. The primary violation is not merely the use of imagery to create confusion, but the fundamental application of the "Basmati" GI name to rice that does not qualify for that designation due to both geographic origin and characteristic standards. The passing off doctrine captures the deception and consumer confusion aspects, but the non-qualifying use principle more precisely addresses the core violation, using a GI name on goods that fail to meet both the geographic and quality requirements. The imagery contributes to the overall deception but is secondary to the fundamental issue that the product is labeled "Basmati" when it objectively does not qualify for that protected geographical indication based on origin and characteristics.

78. Correct Answer: (a) GI protection requires proving that the sign identifies goods with reputation attributable to geography, climate, or cultural practice. Reference: "The geographical indication definition principle provides that a GI is a sign, including denominations of origin, that identifies goods as originating in a specific region with particular qualities or a reputation attributable to local factors such as geography, climate, or cultural practice, and in India GIs are regulated under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: This accurately reflects the geographical indication definition principle as stated in the passage, which "provides that a GI is a sign, including denominations of origin, that identifies goods as originating in a specific region with particular qualities or a reputation attributable to local factors such as geography, climate, or cultural practice." The "Assam Tea" geographical indication satisfies this definition by identifying tea that originates in the Assam region with particular qualities (distinctive malty flavor and golden color) and reputation attributable to local factors (the region's unique climate and terrain). The foundational principle establishes that GI protection is premised on this connection between the sign, the geographic origin, and the qualities/reputation attributable to local

geographic, climatic, or cultural factors. This principle defines the scope and basis of protection, distinguishing geographical indications from ordinary trademarks by emphasizing the essential link between product characteristics and place of origin, which the beverage company's use of "Assam" falsely invokes without any actual connection to Assam tea or its distinctive characteristics.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly suggests that GI protection applies automatically to any product name containing a geographic place name, but the geographical indication definition principle requires more than mere use of a place name, it requires that the sign "identifies goods as originating in a specific region with particular qualities or a reputation attributable to local factors." Not all geographic place names receive GI protection; only those that have been registered as geographical indications under the Act and that meet the definitional requirements of linking specific qualities or reputation to geographic, climatic, or cultural factors of the region. Many geographic names are used descriptively or generically without triggering GI protection. The passage emphasizes that "in India GIs are regulated under the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999," indicating that protection flows from registration and meeting the statutory definition, not automatically from mere use of any geographic place name. The Act establishes a registration system precisely to delineate which geographic signs receive protection.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option incorrectly restricts GI protection to "exact name usage" only, excluding derivative uses, but the passage's description of various infringement principles demonstrates that protection extends beyond exact replication. The deceptively similar marks principle specifically "recognizes that adopting names similar to a registered GI" can exploit reputation and mislead consumers, indicating that protection covers not just identical usage but also similar or derivative uses that create confusion. The false representation and misuse principles similarly address various forms of unauthorized use beyond exact name replication. In the present scenario, "Assam Energy Brew" incorporates "Assam" and creates an association with Assam tea through both the name and the packaging imagery of tea gardens and regional art, which falls within the scope of GI protection even though it is not an exact replication of "Assam Tea." The foundational principle defines GI protection based on the connection between the sign and origin with particular qualities, and derivative uses that exploit

that connection are encompassed within the protective framework.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option incorrectly imposes an actual deception requirement with quantification of deceived consumers, but the geographical indication definition principle focuses on what a GI is and what protection it provides, not on evidentiary thresholds for proving infringement. While proving consumer deception may be relevant to establishing certain types of infringement (particularly under passing off), the foundational principle defining GI protection does not condition that protection on demonstrating actual deception in measurable numbers. The passage indicates that under the passing off doctrine, the plaintiff need only show likelihood of damage, with "damage otherwise assumed when deception is likely," suggesting that likely or probable deception suffices without requiring proof of actual measurable deception. The geographical indication definition principle establishes the substantive basis for protection, the link between sign, origin, and qualities/reputation, independent of whether actual consumer deception has been quantified. Protection flows from the definitional criteria and registration, not from proving that a threshold number of consumers have been actually deceived.

79. Correct Answer: (d) Deceptively similar marks principle applies as adopting "Champagne-Style" exploits Champagne reputation and misleads consumers about authenticity.

Reference: "The deceptively similar marks principle recognizes that adopting names similar to a registered GI, such as 'Darjeeling Gold' or 'Kashmir Pashmina', can exploit reputation and mislead consumers into assuming authenticity."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: The misuse of name and symbols principle, which "addresses the use of a GI's name or trademark on non-genuine goods," is relevant but less precise than the deceptively similar marks principle for this scenario. The misuse of name principle, as exemplified in the passage, addresses direct application of the GI name itself to non-genuine products. However, the distributor here is not using the exact name "Champagne" alone but rather "Champagne-Style," which is a derivative or similar term rather than direct use of the protected name. While "Champagne" appears within "Champagne-

Style," the conduct is more accurately characterized as adopting a deceptively similar name rather than direct misuse of the GI name itself. The passage distinguishes between different types of infringing conduct through separate principles, and the deceptively similar marks principle specifically addresses the scenario where similar or derivative names (rather than exact names) are used, making it the more precise principle for this particular form of exploitation.

Option (b) Incorrect: The non-qualifying use principle, which "covers applying GI names to goods that do not meet prescribed standards or originate outside the relevant area," focuses on the product's failure to meet geographic or quality requirements rather than on the similarity of the name used. While it is true that the California wine does not meet the prescribed standards for authentic Champagne production and does not originate from the Champagne region, the primary concern raised in this scenario is the distributor's use of "Champagne-Style" terminology that exploits the reputation of Champagne through name similarity. The non-qualifying use principle would more directly apply if the distributor were simply using "Champagne" on the California wine, focusing on the mismatch between the name and the product's actual characteristics or origin. However, the use of "Champagne-Style" involves the additional element of adopting a similar name designed to evoke the protected GI while attempting to create technical distinction, which is more precisely addressed by the deceptively similar marks principle that specifically contemplates such derivative naming strategies.

Option (c) Incorrect: While the false representation of origin principle is relevant to GI protection and "explains that GI infringement occurs when a product is marketed as coming from a geographical area without fulfilling qualifying requirements or even being from that area," it is not the most precise principle for this scenario. The distributor is not directly marketing the product as coming from the Champagne region of France; rather, it is using a derivative term "Champagne-Style" that evokes and exploits the reputation of Champagne while attempting to create technical distinction through the "-Style" suffix and disclaimer. The false representation principle is most applicable when there is direct misrepresentation of origin, whereas here the conduct involves using a similar or derivative name that trades on the reputation of the protected GI while attempting to create a veneer of distinction. The deceptively

similar marks principle more precisely addresses this type of conduct where similar rather than identical names are used to exploit GI reputation.

Option (d) Correct: This accurately applies the deceptively similar marks principle as stated in the passage, which "recognizes that adopting names similar to a registered GI, such as 'Darjeeling Gold' or 'Kashmir Pashmina', can exploit reputation and mislead consumers into assuming authenticity." The distributor's use of "Champagne-Style" parallels the examples provided in the passage where modifiers or similar terms are added to protected GI names (like "Gold" or other descriptors). The term "Champagne-Style" adopts a name similar to the registered GI "Champagne" by incorporating the complete protected term with an added suffix, and this similarity exploits the reputation of authentic Champagne while potentially misleading consumers about the wine's authenticity, origin, or connection to the protected region. The principle recognizes that such derivative or similar names, even with disclaimers or modifiers, can create confusion and unfairly trade on the goodwill and reputation built by genuine GI products, making this the most precise principle for addressing the distributor's conduct.

80. Correct Answer: (b) Priya's liability is governed by the contractual stipulation of ₹1.5 lakhs as pre-fixed liquidated damages.

Reference: "Section 74 governs liquidated damages, i.e., sums stipulated in the contract as payable upon breach."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: While Arjun and his wife may have genuinely suffered emotional distress, this option fails to recognize that the parties had already agreed upon a specific sum for breach through their liquidated damages clause. The passage indicates that liquidated damages are "pre-fixed by the parties," meaning the contractual stipulation of ₹1.5 lakhs represents their advance agreement about compensation for this type of breach. Courts generally honor such agreements when parties have negotiated them, as they represent the parties' own assessment of appropriate compensation at the time of contracting. Though aggravated damages for mental distress exist as a category, when parties have included a liquidated damages provision specifically addressing the breach that occurred, that provision typically governs rather than allowing separate claims for emotional harm that

could have been anticipated when the clause was drafted.

Option (b) Correct: This accurately applies Section 74 as stated in the passage, which "governs liquidated damages, i.e., sums stipulated in the contract as payable upon breach." The contract's explicit clause fixing ₹1.5 lakhs for failure to deliver within 60 days constitutes a liquidated damages provision. The passage's discussion of liquidated damages as "pre-fixed by the parties" indicates that when such provisions exist, they govern the compensation without requiring the injured party to prove actual loss or allowing claims for amounts beyond the stipulated sum based on actual harm suffered. The parties' freedom to contract includes the ability to predetermine damages, and Priya's 45-day delay triggers the agreed compensation mechanism of ₹1.5 lakhs, regardless of whether Arjun's actual distress was greater or lesser than what this sum would compensate.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between contractual liquidated damages provisions and judicial damage assessment. While courts do assess damages in cases where no pre-agreed sum exists, the passage's recognition of liquidated damages as a distinct category demonstrates that courts respect parties' contractual arrangements setting compensation amounts. The suggestion that courts "must ignore the contractual figure" contradicts the principle that Section 74 specifically "governs liquidated damages" stipulated by parties. If courts were required to disregard contractual stipulations and independently calculate damages based solely on proven financial losses in every case, the concept of liquidated damages would be meaningless. The passage distinguishes "liquidated damages" (pre-fixed by parties) from "unliquidated damages" (assessed by courts), indicating that both frameworks have validity and contractual stipulations are enforceable.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option attempts to combine the liquidated damages with additional compensation for emotional distress, but this hybrid approach is not supported by the liquidated damages framework. When parties include a liquidated damages clause addressing a specific breach, that provision represents their comprehensive pre-agreed compensation for that breach, not a floor amount that can be supplemented with additional claims. The passage indicates that liquidated damages are "sums stipulated in the contract as payable upon breach," suggesting they function as the agreed-upon remedy rather than a

baseline for further claims. While multiple damage categories may apply in some contracts (for instance, liquidated damages for one type of breach and separately compensable losses for different harms), allowing claims beyond the stipulated amount for the same breach the liquidated damages clause addresses would undermine the purpose of such provisions, providing certainty and avoiding disputes about actual harm.

81. Correct Answer: (c) Aggravated damages compensate for mental distress or aggravation flowing from the supplier's breach of contract.

Reference: "Aggravated damages are compensatory sums awarded for mental distress or aggravation caused by the breach, and exemplary (punitive) damages may exceptionally be granted with a punitive element."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: While the supplier's failure to maintain quality standards may indeed be substantial or complete regarding that aspect of performance, "substantial damages" as a category addresses the extent or magnitude of breach rather than the type of harm suffered. The passage indicates substantial damages "address complete default or failure in performance," which relates to whether the breach was total or partial, not whether it caused economic versus psychological injury. Vikram's anxiety, sleeplessness, and confrontation with backers represent psychological harm requiring a damages category that specifically recognizes mental or emotional injury. Substantial damages would encompass the economic losses from the breach (replacement costs, lost bookings, PR expenses) based on the completeness of the failure, but they do not specifically denote or provide a framework for compensating the psychological trauma Vikram experienced, making this categorization imprecise for addressing his mental distress claim.

Option (b) Incorrect: Nominal damages serve an entirely different purpose than compensating psychological harm. The passage defines them as damages that "vindicate an infringed legal right where no actual loss is proved," and they typically involve minimal symbolic amounts (like ₹1) merely acknowledging a breach occurred. Vikram has proved substantial actual losses, ₹6 lakhs in replacement costs, ₹2 lakhs in PR expenses, ₹4 lakhs in lost bookings,

making nominal damages wholly inappropriate. More fundamentally, nominal damages do not address or compensate mental distress; they simply recognize a legal wrong without quantifying harm. Vikram's claim involves significant documented economic losses plus psychological suffering, both requiring substantive compensation rather than the symbolic vindication that nominal damages provide. Suggesting nominal damages for psychological trauma would leave Vikram completely uncompensated for his anxiety and emotional suffering, contradicting the purpose of damages to make the injured party whole.

Option (c) Correct: This precisely applies the aggravated damages category as defined in the passage: "compensatory sums awarded for mental distress or aggravation caused by the breach." Vikram's severe anxiety, sleeplessness, and the psychological impact of confronting his financial backers who questioned his competence constitute exactly the type of mental distress this damages category addresses. The passage distinguishes aggravated damages from purely economic loss categories by emphasizing they compensate psychological or emotional injury arising from breach. The supplier's delivery of substandard linens caused not just economic harm but also significant psychological trauma to Vikram, and aggravated damages provide the legal framework for compensating such non-economic losses. The ₹3 lakhs claimed for psychological toll would be assessed under this category, which recognizes that breaches can cause genuine mental suffering deserving compensation beyond purely financial losses.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option confuses exemplary (punitive) damages with aggravated (compensatory) damages. The passage explicitly distinguishes them: aggravated damages compensate mental distress while "exemplary (punitive) damages may exceptionally be granted with a punitive element." Exemplary damages serve to punish wrongdoers and deter future misconduct rather than compensate victims for specific harm suffered. They exceed what's necessary for compensation and are imposed when conduct is particularly egregious, malicious, or reckless. While the supplier's quality control failures might warrant exemplary damages if sufficiently reprehensible, that would address the wrongfulness of the supplier's conduct rather than compensating Vikram's mental distress. Vikram's anxiety and psychological suffering require aggravated damages (compensatory in nature), though he could potentially claim both aggravated

damages (to compensate his distress) and exemplary damages (to punish the supplier's conduct) as separate relief serving different purposes.

82. Correct Answer: (d) Courts may moderate damages considering the security deposit and potentially order partial refund to achieve fair compensation.

Reference: "In *Union of India v. K.H. Rao* (1976), the Supreme Court scaled down damages to the extent of the security deposit and directed refund of the entire deposit when allowing the appeal in part, illustrating judicial moderation of damages in light of the contract's security arrangements."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: This option overstates the government's entitlement under Section 75 by asserting it receives "₹60 lakhs compensation plus retention of the entire ₹25 lakhs deposit" without qualification. While Section 75 does "entitle a party who rightfully rescinds a contract to compensation for loss sustained through non-fulfilment," the *Union of India v. K.H. Rao* precedent demonstrates this compensatory right is subject to judicial moderation considering security arrangements. Courts don't automatically award full claimed damages plus allow complete security deposit forfeiture without examining whether combined recovery exceeds actual loss. The passage emphasizes "judicial moderation of damages in light of the contract's security arrangements," indicating Section 75 compensation and security deposit forfeitures are assessed holistically to determine appropriate total recovery. Automatic entitlement to both full damages and complete deposit retention could result in over-compensation, which courts prevent through the moderation principle established in the precedent.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option incorrectly invokes "liquidated damages principles" and suggests they "require independent judicial assessment unaffected by security deposit terms," but this conflates distinct contractual mechanisms. Section 74 governs "liquidated damages, i.e., sums stipulated in the contract as payable upon breach", pre-agreed damage amounts specified contractually. Security deposits are different instruments: amounts deposited to secure performance that may be forfeited upon breach but serve a different function than liquidated damages clauses. Nothing in the scenario suggests the contract contained a liquidated damages provision; rather, there was a security deposit arrangement. The *Union of India*

v. K.H. Rao precedent doesn't apply Section 74 principles but demonstrates judicial discretion in moderating damages when security deposits exist. Courts don't assess security deposits through liquidated damages frameworks; they exercise equitable discretion ensuring total recovery (forfeited deposit plus damages awarded) corresponds to actual loss without over-compensation.

Option (c) Incorrect: This option mischaracterizes Section 73 as mandating "full compensation" of ₹60 lakhs "regardless of the ₹25 lakhs security deposit already forfeited," but this mechanical application ignores the judicial moderation principle illustrated in *Union of India v. K.H. Rao*. While Section 73 establishes that breaching parties must "compensate the injured party for loss or damage caused by the breach," the passage demonstrates through precedent that courts don't apply this principle rigidly without considering other contractual arrangements like security deposits. The Supreme Court precedent shows that courts "scaled down damages to the extent of the security deposit," meaning the existence and forfeiture of the ₹25 lakhs deposit is highly relevant to determining ultimate damages. Courts aim for compensation that makes the injured party whole without double-recovery or windfall gains. Simply adding ₹60 lakhs in damages to the ₹25 lakhs already forfeited might over-compensate the government or exceed actual losses, which courts moderate through equitable assessment.

Option (d) Correct: This accurately reflects the principle from *Union of India v. K.H. Rao* (1976), where "the Supreme Court scaled down damages to the extent of the security deposit and directed refund of the entire deposit when allowing the appeal in part, illustrating judicial moderation of damages in light of the contract's security arrangements." The precedent establishes that courts exercise discretion when security deposits exist, recognizing they serve as partial compensation or security for breach. The government has forfeited ₹25 lakhs and claims ₹60 lakhs more (₹48 lakhs replacement plus ₹12 lakhs consequential costs), totaling ₹85 lakhs recovery against a ₹60 lakhs advance paid. Courts would examine whether this total recovery appropriately corresponds to actual loss or constitutes over-compensation, potentially reducing the damages award or ordering partial refund of the security deposit to achieve equitable balance. This moderation prevents unjust enrichment while ensuring adequate compensation.

83. Correct Answer: (c) Courts may deduct the money value of time and litigation expenses from awarded compensation rather than adding them.

Reference: "In *Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Aircraft Ltd.* (1969), the Supreme Court observed that the awarded compensation may be taken as the measure of damages, subject to deduction for the money value of services, time, and energy spent in pursuing the claim and litigation expenses culminating in the award."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Incorrect: While Section 73 does establish that breaching parties must "compensate the injured party for loss or damage caused by the breach," characterizing the ₹8 lakhs in legal fees and CEO time as automatically compensable "direct consequences" ignores the specific principle established in *Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills* regarding litigation-related expenses. That precedent distinguishes between losses caused by the breach itself (like the ₹18 lakhs spent on ArchFix to remedy the defective design) and costs incurred in pursuing legal claims about those losses. The Supreme Court established that litigation expenses and time spent pursuing claims are not simply added to damage awards as additional compensation but rather are considered as potential deductions from gross compensation, recognizing that pursuing remedies involves costs that diminish the net benefit of recovery. Section 73's general compensatory principle doesn't override this specific judicial treatment of litigation-related costs.

Option (b) Incorrect: This option correctly identifies that incidental damages would cover the ₹18 lakhs paid to ArchFix Solutions (as "expenses reasonably incurred after learning of the breach, such as costs of replacement, return, or cover"), and correctly notes that litigation-related expenditures are treated differently. However, it frames this as simple exclusion, that such costs are "not" covered, without explaining the nuanced principle from *Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills*. The precedent doesn't merely exclude litigation costs from damage awards; it establishes they may be considered as deductions from awarded compensation. The difference is significant: exclusion means they're simply not compensated, while the deduction principle means they're recognized as reducing the net value of any compensation awarded. This option oversimplifies by not acknowledging the specific treatment litigation expenses receive under the precedent.

Option (c) Correct: This accurately applies the principle from *Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Aircraft Ltd.* (1969), where "the Supreme Court observed that the awarded compensation may be taken as the measure of damages, subject to deduction for the money value of services, time, and energy spent in pursuing the claim and litigation expenses culminating in the award." Cityscape's ₹8 lakhs comprising legal fees, consultant costs, and CEO time spent managing the crisis and pursuing remedies falls squarely within this principle. Rather than awarding these as additional damages on top of the ₹18 lakhs remedial costs, courts consider them as factors that reduce the net benefit Cityscape receives from any damage award. If the court awards ₹18 lakhs for the ArchFix costs, it recognizes that Cityscape's net recovery is diminished by the money, time, and energy spent pursuing the claim, but these aren't added as separate line items.

Option (d) Incorrect: This option misapplies Section 75 by suggesting it entitles Cityscape to the full ₹26 lakhs (₹18 lakhs remedial costs plus ₹8 lakhs in litigation-related expenses) as compensation for "non-fulfilment." While Section 75 does state that parties who "rightfully rescind a contract" are entitled to "compensation for loss sustained through non-fulfilment," this provision addresses losses arising from the breach itself, such as defective performance and consequential harms, rather than expenses incurred in litigation to recover those losses. The *Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills* precedent establishes a distinct principle for litigation costs and time spent pursuing claims: they're treated as potential deductions from awarded compensation rather than additional compensable losses under Section 75. The provision compensates for breach-related losses (the ₹18 lakhs remedial work), but litigation expenses receive different treatment under the precedent, preventing this option's claim of automatic ₹26 lakhs entitlement.

84. Correct Answer: (a) Yes, because expenses reasonably incurred after learning of the breach are compensable as incidental loss.

Reference Line: "Loss may be consequential (resulting effects of the breach) or incidental (expenses reasonably incurred after learning of the breach, such as costs of replacement, return, or cover)."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

Option (a) Correct: The emergency replacement cost clearly qualifies as incidental loss because it was a

reasonable expenditure incurred after discovering the breach to limit further harm. Lawful compensation includes such costs because they are a foreseeable and rational reaction to the disruption caused by breach. FreshMart's action to hire another carrier was proportionate, timely, and consistent with commercial prudence. The expense was not voluntary but necessary to protect perishable goods and sustain contractual obligations to third parties. Courts routinely classify such mitigation expenses as recoverable, recognizing that failure to incur them could worsen overall damage.

Option (b) Incorrect: The contention that consequential or incidental losses are too remote disregards the purpose of damages, which is to make good foreseeable injury caused by breach. The legal test for remoteness excludes only speculative or extraordinary losses outside the contemplation of parties. In this case, FreshMart's emergency costs were an ordinary and predictable result of refrigeration failure in a perishable goods contract. The expenditure bears a direct causal relationship to the breach and satisfies the criterion of reasonable foreseeability. Far from being remote, it represents the precise type of incidental loss contemplated by law.

Option (c) Incorrect: The principle of compensation does not extend to every expense that follows a breach,

irrespective of necessity or causation. The law distinguishes between reasonable, foreseeable mitigation costs and voluntary, discretionary expenditures. FreshMart's expenses would qualify only if incurred directly because of TruckFast's non-performance and not due to independent business preferences. Automatic recovery without scrutiny would encourage inefficient conduct and speculative claims. Damages law aims to restore the injured party's position, not to provide a windfall or reward unnecessary costs that are unconnected to contractual harm.

Option (d) Incorrect: The narrow view that only direct losses are recoverable misstates the established framework of contractual damages. Compensation covers both immediate and derivative consequences if they are the natural result of the breach and foreseeable at the time of contracting. The replacement cost in this case was neither remote nor an unrelated business decision, it was a necessary reaction to continued failure of performance. Limiting recovery to "direct" losses alone would undermine the principle that the injured party must act reasonably to mitigate damage, and that reasonable mitigation expenses are recoverable in full.

85. Correct Answer: (a) Ecological interventions that ignore soil quality may neutralize the benefits of increasing forest coverage.

Reference Line: "Rising temperatures and drying soil. Put simply, while India may be growing its forest cover, these forests are becoming less effective at absorbing carbon."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option captures an inference about the relationship between ecological interventions and soil quality. The passage suggests that increased forest area is no longer sufficient if soil conditions are deteriorating, implying that planting trees without addressing environmental degradation (like drying soils) will not result in effective carbon sequestration. The phrase "forests are becoming less effective at absorbing carbon" even as forest cover grows points toward the hidden variable of soil health. This indicates that the success of restoration is contingent not just on visual greening, but on ecological underpinnings such as soil moisture and temperature conditions. Therefore, the option rightly infers that ignoring soil quality may nullify the intended climate benefits. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) This option makes a general claim that afforestation will increase national water availability even without concern for what species are planted. However, the passage criticizes past strategies involving fast-growing species such as eucalyptus and acacia, which have been shown to deplete groundwater, not improve it. The author argues for site-specific native species instead of generic expansion, indicating that species-level decisions significantly affect water and soil dynamics. Hence, assuming that water will improve regardless of species contradicts the passage's ecological argument. Therefore, this is an inaccurate inference. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option prioritizes funding over ecological design, which misrepresents the passage's emphasis. While financing is indeed identified as one of the "three stubborn gaps" in India's afforestation story, the passage goes to greater lengths in detailing the flaws of ecological design and inadequate institutional capacity. It highlights training institutes and state-level initiatives as solutions, indicating that design and implementation capacity are more central to success than sheer funding. Therefore, although financing is important, it is not more critical than ecological planning, making this option a flawed inference. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option introduces an idea — wildlife conservation as the most efficient route to carbon neutrality — that is not supported or even discussed in the passage. The focus of the passage is on forest resilience, native biodiversity, afforestation models, and carbon sinks, but it does not suggest that wildlife conservation is either a key mechanism or the most

efficient one for reducing carbon emissions. The passage's environmental lens is more ecological-functional than faunal or species-preservationist. Therefore, this option introduces a theme beyond the author's framework. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

86. Correct Answer: (a) Ensuring that forest policy implementation accounts for ground realities is essential to achieving ecological goals.

Reference Line: "But as with most ambitious missions, the challenge lies in turning policy into practice."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option reflects the author's key concern that while policies like the Green India Mission are well-intentioned and ambitious, their success depends on effective implementation at the grassroots level. The passage makes repeated references to the gap between central planning and field-level execution, citing examples like the bypassing of forest communities and inadequate ecological capacity among forest departments. The author underscores that ecological resilience, local participation, and institutional capacity are essential to meaningful afforestation outcomes. Therefore, aligning policy implementation with ground realities is central to the author's argument. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) While the author supports community participation, they also explicitly criticize the use of fast-growing exotic species such as eucalyptus and acacia. These species are described as ecologically harmful — depleting groundwater and threatening biodiversity — which suggests that the problem is not simply one of management, but of intrinsic ecological unsuitability. Therefore, even if community-led initiatives support such plantations, the author would likely disapprove of their use on ecological grounds. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The passage includes "financing" as one of the challenges but treats it as part of a trio, along with ecological design and community participation. It also expresses skepticism about capacity gaps within institutions, highlighting that money alone cannot address problems if the forest departments lack expertise. Thus, merely increasing budgets would not automatically solve institutional weaknesses or coordination failures. The passage stresses training, knowledge, and design, not just financial input. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The author explicitly favors community-based approaches and provides examples such as Joint Forest Management Committees in Odisha and tribal partnerships in Chhattisgarh. The tone and examples in the passage suggest strong advocacy for localized, bottom-up engagement rather than centralized control. Suggesting that central authorities are better than local committees contradicts the author's argument that

legitimacy, trust, and effectiveness arise from involving those directly connected to the forests. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

87. Correct Answer: (c) Strengthening institutional knowledge of site-specific ecology through dedicated training and networks.

Reference Line: "India already has training institutes in Uttarakhand, Coimbatore, and Byrnihat that could be harnessed to equip frontline staff with ecological know-how."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option assumes that proximity to urban areas will improve plantation outcomes due to ease of access and oversight. However, the author is not concerned with administrative convenience but with the ecological quality and social legitimacy of restoration. Peri-urban locations may not reflect the ecological priorities or degraded zones targeted by the Green India Mission. The success of afforestation is framed in the passage as a function of ecological appropriateness and local involvement, not proximity to urban centers. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) While drought-resistant species may be useful in certain regions, mandating a fixed allocation of funds for them overlooks the passage's emphasis on site-specific, native species. The author argues that ecological restoration must respond to local biodiversity needs rather than adopt uniform prescriptions. A fixed quota assumes homogeneity across regions, which the passage challenges through its support for landscape-specific strategies. Therefore, this option is inconsistent with the author's flexible, context-sensitive approach. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) The passage highlights a serious gap in the ecological knowledge and capacity of forest departments. The author names specific training institutions and suggests their potential for improving on-ground implementation. This implies that one of the most critical barriers to success is the lack of institutional understanding of ecosystem dynamics, which can lead to misguided plantation strategies. By improving technical expertise among forestry personnel, restoration efforts would likely be more ecologically sound and climate-resilient. Hence, option (c) is the correct answer.

(d) This option reflects an emphasis on speed and scalability, proposing private-public partnerships to accelerate green cover. However, the passage critiques exactly such outcome-oriented approaches, particularly where they prioritize canopy metrics over ecological resilience. The author is skeptical of fast-growing plantations and centralized execution models, especially when they ignore local needs and ecological considerations. Fast-tracking projects may therefore replicate earlier mistakes, which the revised GIM seeks to correct. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

88. Correct Answer: (d) Mixed plantations often experience higher mortality rates than monocultures during extreme weather events.

Reference Line: "They deplete groundwater, crowd out native biodiversity, and leave forests vulnerable to climate stress."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option challenges one aspect of the author's criticism—that eucalyptus harms soil and water systems—by offering evidence that such plantations improved soil retention. However, this focuses on a single ecological indicator and does not address the broader claim about forest vulnerability and biodiversity. Soil retention is only one factor among many (e.g., climate resilience, species interaction, hydrological impact). Therefore, while it partially complicates the author's case, it does not decisively weaken the argument about overall ecological fragility. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) Although this option offers a functional benefit of fast-growing species—faster disaster recovery—it does not effectively rebut the core claim that monocultures lack resilience. Quick regrowth is a short-term trait and does not ensure long-term ecological stability. The author's concern is that monocultures make ecosystems more vulnerable to climate extremes and biodiversity collapse, not just physical damage. Therefore, this option addresses a limited aspect without invalidating the larger ecological critique. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option claims that acacia regenerates well after controlled burns, which might suggest adaptability. However, like (a), it addresses only one species-specific characteristic and does not generalize to all monocultures. Regrowth after burning does not automatically translate into ecosystem-wide resilience, especially when considering groundwater usage, biodiversity loss, and resistance to temperature extremes. Therefore, while interesting, it fails to weaken the core ecological criticism raised by the author. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option challenges the central premise that species-diverse plantations are more resilient. If mixed forests actually suffer higher mortality rates during climate events, then the entire ecological rationale for avoiding monocultures is undermined. This would mean that monocultures may, in fact, offer greater survival stability under stress, making them preferable under certain environmental pressures. Such evidence would overturn a key foundation of the author's argument, making this the most damaging counterpoint. Hence, option (d) is the correct answer.

89. Correct Answer: (b) Institutional mandates alone are insufficient to drive ecologically sound restoration in forest ecosystems.

Reference Line: “The real test is whether local forest departments possess the necessary expertise and capacity to deliver.”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option suggests that ecological damage from past afforestation mistakes is irreversible, which would make the case for caution in restoration. However, the author’s argument does not rely on irreversibility, but on the importance of doing it right the first time. The passage discusses the negative impacts of monocultures and poor design, but does not state or assume that these harms are beyond correction. The critique is not built on the impossibility of reversal, but on the need for better implementation practices. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This option correctly identifies a foundational assumption behind the author’s position. The critique throughout the passage rests on the idea that simply having policies or programs like the Green India Mission is not enough. The author stresses that implementation is hindered by a lack of ecological knowledge, training, and institutional capacity, especially within state-level forest departments. The belief that mandates alone cannot ensure quality restoration underlies the argument for reform and ecological training. Without this assumption, the critique loses its force. Hence, option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) While the author is critical of outcomes such as superficial green cover metrics, there is no explicit or necessary assumption that the government always or generally prefers visible outcomes to meaningful ones. The argument could stand even if the government intends to do the right thing but fails due to lack of ecological understanding or administrative capacity. Therefore, this assumption is not essential to the author’s line of reasoning. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option introduces a policy implication — that India’s national climate targets need reevaluation. However, the author’s focus is on how to achieve the carbon sink target, not on whether it should be revised. The argument does not rest on questioning the target itself, but on improving the method — through better design and inclusive practices. Thus, the assumption about altering national targets is not required for the argument to hold. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

90. Correct Answer: (b) Conflicts over land tenure will likely delay ecological initiatives and reduce policy credibility on the ground.

Reference Line: “Yet in practice, many plantation drives bypass these communities, ignoring their claims and consent. This erodes trust and undermines both legality and social legitimacy.”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option imagines a scenario where forest land is diverted for commercial use due to poor oversight, but the passage does not suggest that commercial leasing is an immediate or likely consequence of ignoring community participation. While privatization or exploitation is possible in theory, the author’s concern is primarily about legitimacy, consent, and trust, not commercial encroachment. Thus, this outcome, while plausible in a broader context, is not supported or implied within the scope of the argument. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage explicitly discusses how bypassing forest communities erodes legal and social legitimacy. If the state continues to implement afforestation projects without honoring community rights under the Forest Rights Act, local populations may resist or challenge these actions legally or socially. This would likely result in delays, administrative bottlenecks, and weakening of institutional credibility, all of which undermine the effectiveness of ecological missions. Therefore, this is the most likely and well-supported consequence. Hence, option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) The morale and retention of forest department staff is not a concern addressed in the passage. Although the author does emphasize training and capacity-building for forest officials, there is no link drawn between community exclusion and staff turnover. The core issue is the relationship between the state and local communities, not internal workforce satisfaction. Therefore, this option is speculative and unrelated to the argument’s core logic. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) Although rural-urban migration is a complex phenomenon that may relate to forest livelihoods, the passage does not discuss migration trends or suggest that alienation from forests will cause demographic shifts. The focus is on rights, consent, and participation, not population movement or labor migration. Therefore, while logically possible, this outcome is too far removed from the central claims to be considered the most likely result. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

91. Correct Answer: (b) The ideological exhaustion of legacy parties may allow ambiguous political platforms to gain meaningful traction.

Reference Line: “His ideological equivocations and the talk of governance may work as an asset for a politics that avoids current ideological tropes.”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option assumes that Bihar’s electorate remains firmly anchored to traditional ideological loyalties, such as caste and religion. However, the author’s argument pushes back against this view, suggesting

that the dominance of such ideologies is weakening due to their perceived failures in delivery and governance. The passage asserts that neither Hindutva nor social-justice frameworks are meeting the evolving expectations of voters. Therefore, traditional ideological appeals are seen as increasingly inadequate. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This option captures the central thrust of the author's argument: that a state of ideological fatigue has set in among voters, and this vacuum opens the door for new kinds of politics. The author suggests that PK's ideological non-alignment, paired with a focus on governance, positions him to benefit from this ideological exhaustion. Importantly, this argument does not guarantee electoral success but highlights an opening that ambiguous platforms can explore. Hence, option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) This option claims that voters in Bihar demand ideological consistency, but the passage implies the opposite — that ambiguity and flexibility may now be strengths. The author views PK's strategic avoidance of fixed ideological responses, particularly in relation to polarizing issues like Hindutva, as an asset in a voter climate that is tired of binary political frameworks. Hence, the assertion about expected ideological consistency misrepresents the author's argument. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) While the passage acknowledges that PK is a new and untested political actor, it does not argue that his limited visibility or lack of ideological clarity is a disadvantage. In fact, the author presents these traits as potentially beneficial in a landscape where traditional players have lost credibility. The uncertainty around PK's platform is framed more as a source of curiosity and opportunity than as a liability. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

92. Correct Answer: (b) Caste-based alliances alone can ensure electoral victory in Bihar despite performance-related shortcomings.

Reference Line: "First, the social-justice bloc has long faced a crisis of double credibility – it does not deliver much, and if it does, the lower sections among the backward castes rarely receive much."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) The passage provides multiple reasons why a non-aligned political actor like PK might gain ground in Bihar. It emphasizes voter disillusionment with legacy ideologies and the space that opens up for platforms that avoid rigid ideological affiliations. The author discusses how ideological ambiguity can work as an advantage, especially when framed around governance and delivery. Therefore, the author would be likely to agree with this statement rather than oppose it. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This statement suggests that caste alliances, by themselves, are sufficient for securing electoral victory, even in the absence of delivery. The author challenges

this directly by stating that the social-justice bloc has not only under-delivered but has also alienated the lower castes within its own base. This reveals a breakdown of credibility that makes exclusive reliance on caste an insufficient electoral strategy today. The author thus critiques the assumption that identity-based mobilization alone is electorally sustainable. Hence, option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) The author implies that voters may now respond more favorably to pragmatic and governance-oriented messaging than to ideologically rigid rhetoric. PK's ideological ambiguity is seen not as a weakness but as a calculated move that could resonate with an electorate tired of stale ideological battles. The possibility that voters may prioritize competence over ideological symbolism aligns with the author's outlook. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) The passage makes repeated observations about the declining effectiveness of legacy parties. It argues that both Hindutva and social-justice platforms are failing to deliver, and that traditional voter blocs are fragmenting. This statement, which suggests that old parties are losing their grasp on their constituencies, aligns with the passage's overall tone and argument. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

93. Correct Answer: (a) Since voters still rely on caste identities, parties lacking traditional bases are unlikely to succeed electorally.

Reference Line: "It is too simplistic to imagine solid vote blocs behind any of the political forces."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This statement reflects flawed reasoning because it assumes that caste identities continue to dominate electoral choices in a rigid and predictable way. The passage challenges this assumption by arguing that voter loyalties are more fluid and that past voting patterns no longer guarantee future results. It notes the unreliability of caste as a singular electoral strategy, especially for traditional parties. By failing to acknowledge the complexity of evolving political behavior, the reasoning here becomes simplistic and logically weak. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) This interpretation is consistent with the passage's argument that PK's refusal to engage in clear ideological alignments may be intentional. The author suggests that this ambiguity could be a strategy aimed at attracting those voters who are disenchanted with both Hindutva and Mandal politics. Since this view acknowledges a deliberate rationale behind PK's position, it reflects a nuanced understanding of the political context. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option aligns with the author's core contention that governance discourse may be more effective in an environment where ideological frameworks have lost credibility. The suggestion that voters are ready to evaluate performance-based messaging reflects the

author's hope for a shift toward issue-based politics. It is not flawed but rather reinforces the thesis that ideological fatigue can be politically transformative. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This reasoning is consistent with the passage's view that electoral support now requires more than inherited identities or dogmatic positions. The suggestion that performance and governance appeal can cut across conventional loyalties supports the author's critique of rigid vote banks. Rather than flawed, this line of thinking accurately interprets the political opening described for non-traditional parties like Jan Suraj. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

94. Correct Answer: (c) Candidates with no ideological label but a governance agenda have performed well in recent Bihar elections.

Reference Line: "His ideological equivocations and the talk of governance may work as an asset..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option would weaken, rather than strengthen, the author's argument. If voters overwhelmingly favor leaders with well-defined ideological commitments, then the premise that ambiguity and governance can work as political assets becomes questionable. It implies that voters see non-ideological stances as indecisive or uninspiring, which contradicts the passage's portrayal of ideological fatigue. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This option introduces a demographic-specific claim that may be partially relevant but doesn't enhance the author's argument. Even if younger voters prefer ideological clarity, the author's claim is about a broader trend of disillusionment across caste and ideological lines. The passage focuses on the general electorate's receptiveness to governance-focused narratives, not specific voter groups. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option supports the author's argument that voters may respond positively to governance-focused approaches, especially when they are not tied to legacy ideological frameworks. If candidates who avoid ideological positioning are achieving success, it provides empirical support for the idea that such a strategy resonates with voters. This aligns with the author's suggestion that ideological ambiguity can be politically advantageous. Hence, option (c) is the correct answer.

(d) This option undermines the passage's argument by implying that governance-focused leaders lack credibility unless backed by strong ideological branding. It suggests that administrative performance alone cannot generate trust, contradicting the author's claim that voters may be turning away from identity

politics toward delivery-based alternatives. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

95. Correct Answer: (b) Use its outsider image to challenge both ideological extremes without declaring allegiance to either camp.

Reference Line: "PK brings to the political menu a new offering that does not emerge from these legacies... That is also where his opportunities lie."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option recommends that PK root his party's strategy in a clear ideological tradition, likely referring to either the Mandal or Hindutva blocs. However, the passage strongly critiques both these traditions, describing them as ideologically exhausted and inadequate for addressing today's voter expectations. The author sees PK's lack of traditional alignment not as a liability but as an opening to present something distinct. By adopting a fixed ideological stance, PK would risk blending into the very ideological spectrum the author says voters are disillusioned with. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) The passage repeatedly emphasizes that PK's unique positioning stems from his detachment from the dominant ideological narratives of Bihar. His refusal to explicitly engage with the BJP's Hindutva rhetoric and his non-affiliation with the Mandal tradition are portrayed as calculated and potentially beneficial. This neutrality enables him to craft a campaign centered on governance and delivery, which the author views as a gap in the current political offerings. Using his outsider status to critique both extremes without aligning with either allows him to attract voters seeking new alternatives. Hence, option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) Although challenging the BJP's ideology might be a tempting strategy to gain distinction, the author explicitly notes that PK has avoided such ideological confrontations. This strategic ambiguity is seen as an asset, not a weakness. By prioritizing an anti-Hindutva stance, PK would effectively enter into a polarizing debate, forcing voters to place him within the very ideological dichotomy he has so far avoided. This approach contradicts the passage's framing of his strategy as one of ideological restraint and issue-focused positioning. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) While forming alliances with existing political groups may provide immediate visibility, this approach undermines PK's unique positioning. The passage criticizes the social-justice bloc for its "double credibility crisis" — both its governance failures and its inability to meet the expectations of its most vulnerable supporters. Abandoning a focus on governance in favor of alignment with discredited factions would erode the distinctive platform the author sees as PK's main

opportunity. Such a strategy would tie PK's party to legacy failures rather than offering a clean break. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

96. Correct Answer: (c) New parties that avoid ideological commitments may benefit from the electorate's dissatisfaction with old platforms.

Reference Line: "The ideological bankruptcy of the social-justice ideology and the inadequacy of Hindutva... have produced an ideological vacuum."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option draws a sweeping and static conclusion about Bihar's electoral history, suggesting that ideologically defined parties have always enjoyed greater success than political newcomers. However, the author's argument focuses precisely on the evolving nature of voter behavior and the growing fatigue with traditional ideological camps. He implies that the historical dominance of these parties is no longer a guarantee of future relevance, especially as they fail to deliver on governance and inclusion. This conclusion ignores the dynamic nature of the current political transition in Bihar. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This statement contradicts the author's thesis that governance-oriented platforms, even if lacking strong ideological clarity, might now be more attractive to voters. The passage suggests that ideological positioning may no longer be the decisive factor, especially in a context where performance and delivery are increasingly valued. The idea that governance without ideology is unlikely to resonate implies that voters remain committed to old identity politics, which the author argues is no longer true. Therefore, this conclusion misreads the shift in voter expectations described in the text. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This conclusion flows logically from the passage's analysis of ideological fatigue and the emergence of a political vacuum. The author states that both Hindutva and Mandal ideologies have failed to address the practical concerns of the electorate, thereby creating space for alternatives. PK's non-ideological and governance-driven approach is framed as a strategic attempt to respond to this vacuum. The idea that ideologically ambiguous parties may benefit from voter dissatisfaction with legacy platforms captures the essence of the passage's argument. Hence, option (c) is the correct answer.

(d) This conclusion assumes that PK's success will depend on winning over caste-based vote blocs, which the author explicitly critiques as a simplistic reading of Bihar's political realities. The passage challenges the idea that these blocs are fixed or dependable, noting that even the social-justice coalition has lost credibility among its core voters. Instead, the author points to the need for complex and cross-cutting coalitions that go beyond caste or identity politics. Therefore, tying Jan

Suraj's prospects to caste alliances contradicts the analytical perspective advanced in the text. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

97. Correct Answer: (a) The appellate hierarchy under BNSS prevents unfiltered access to higher courts by setting judicial entry barriers.

Reference Line: "Appeals lie only against acquittal orders passed by courts subordinate to the High Court... intervention remains truly exceptional."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option accurately captures the structural limitations imposed by the BNSS on appellate review. It is not a paraphrase but an inference drawn from the fact that acquittals by subordinate courts require leave (permission) of the High Court to be appealed. Further, acquittals by the High Court can only be challenged before the Supreme Court through a special leave petition under Article 136, which is granted only in rare cases. These procedural thresholds serve as filters or "entry barriers" to prevent frequent and unregulated challenges to acquittals. The use of the phrase "unfiltered access" is apt because the legal system is deliberately designed to prevent the overburdening of higher courts and to preserve the finality of decisions unless exceptional circumstances arise. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) This option misrepresents a core principle in the appellate structure. BNSS Section 419, like its CrPC counterpart, clearly requires that the State must obtain leave of the High Court before appealing an acquittal. The statement assumes unrestricted appellate access by the State, which is legally inaccurate. Such a misinterpretation suggests a misunderstanding of how procedural safeguards are used to prevent misuse of the appellate system. The BNSS does not allow automatic appeal rights; instead, it filters them through judicial discretion. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option draws an inaccurate causal connection between procedural efficiency and victim participation. While the passage does acknowledge that BNSS improves victim participation—such as by providing appeal rights in complaint cases—it does not link procedural efficiency (like digital documentation or timeline enforcement) to the aim of enhancing victim roles. The author treats these two reforms—efficiency and inclusion—as parallel but distinct objectives. Therefore, stating that victim involvement drives procedural efficiency is an unsupported inference. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option assumes that the Supreme Court routinely reviews acquittals passed by High Courts, which contradicts the author's assertion that such appeals are allowed only through special leave and remain "truly exceptional." The use of the word "regularly" distorts the rare and discretionary nature of Article 136 appeals. Moreover, the idea that the

Supreme Court functions as a reviewing authority to ensure “consistency” implies a supervisory role that does not align with the Constitution’s intent behind special leave petitions, which are case-specific and not aimed at systemic review. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

98. Correct Answer: (d) Every acquittal under BNSS results from a comprehensive trial involving full witness examination and legal arguments.

Reference Line: “The distinction between acquittals following complete adjudication on merits and those granted at preliminary stages creates two distinct categories...”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option correctly reflects the procedural nuance in the BNSS. The passage explains that in complaint cases (filed by private individuals), the complainant may appeal acquittals, but only with special leave. This is distinct from cases prosecuted by the State, where the government is the appellant with different procedural routes. Thus, this separation is consistent with the information provided and does not contradict any claim in the passage. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This option aligns with the appellate structure outlined in the BNSS. The requirement of obtaining judicial leave before appealing acquittals from subordinate courts is an important safeguard against abuse of process. The passage reaffirms this through its reference to BNSS Section 419, which continues the framework of CrPC Section 378. The assumption here is fully supported by the legal process explained. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This statement is factually accurate and corresponds with the passage’s explanation of the role of Article 136. The author notes that when the High Court acquits the accused, further challenge is only possible through a special leave petition to the Supreme Court. This means that no ordinary appeal lies beyond the High Court level, affirming the exclusivity of the Supreme Court’s special jurisdiction. The use of “only” in this context is consistent with the exceptional nature of such reviews. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option presents a sweeping generalization that is directly challenged by the passage’s discussion of two types of acquittals: (i) those after a complete trial, and (ii) those granted at preliminary or intermediate stages. The author emphasizes that not all acquittals under BNSS arise from full-fledged trials involving cross-examination of witnesses and detailed legal arguments. Some occur early in the process—for example, if the case lacks prima facie evidence or is withdrawn. By stating that “every” acquittal results from comprehensive trial procedures, the option

assumes uniformity where none exists and contradicts the structural and legal distinctions the author carefully outlines. Hence, option (d) is the correct answer.

99. Correct Answer: (a) The BNSS accelerates trial procedures through fixed timelines but retains appellate delays through exceptional petition rights.

Reference Line: “These reforms accelerate the adjudicatory process without compromising the substantive protection... intervention remains truly exceptional.”

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option captures a classic paradox: the BNSS introduces fixed timelines and digital systems to make trial-level adjudication faster and more efficient, yet simultaneously retains a mechanism—Article 136—for appellate review that is discretionary, unpredictable, and potentially slow. This creates an apparent contradiction between the push for procedural speed and the preservation of a slow, elite appellate gatekeeping mechanism. The paradox is that both goals coexist despite being conceptually at odds. On deeper reflection, however, this paradox makes sense as it balances judicial efficiency with constitutional safeguards. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.

(b) This option expresses a legal tension, not a paradox. The BNSS affirms finality for trial court acquittals, but also enhances victim rights through limited appeal options. This may seem conflicting at a glance, but it is structurally coherent because the victim’s rights are bound by leave requirements and time constraints. There is no absurdity or contradiction; the two ideas are meant to function together within a carefully designed appellate process. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option attempts to introduce a contradiction by focusing on prosecutorial failure as the basis for acquittal. However, in criminal jurisprudence, it is standard that the burden lies with the prosecution, and failure to meet it results in acquittal. There is no paradox in this outcome; it’s a predictable consequence of the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This option reflects a legal truth, not an internal contradiction. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option points to inconsistency in appellate treatment, which may be a valid critique but does not present a paradox. A paradox requires a situation where two coexisting principles seem to cancel each other out but ultimately do not. Lack of uniformity in appellate standards may suggest administrative or doctrinal inconsistency, but it does not embody a self-conflicting reality. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

100. Correct Answer: (b) A substantial number of trial-level acquittals result from procedural defaults rather than a full evidentiary assessment.

Reference Line: "These represent complete judicial exercises where evidence has been thoroughly evaluated, witnesses subjected to cross-examination..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option reinforces the author's argument rather than weakening it. The reluctance of higher courts to interfere with lower court acquittals implies that such acquittals are respected due to the depth of judicial scrutiny they are presumed to reflect. This judicial deference supports the claim that post-trial acquittals are robust and carefully considered. Thus, this information, if true, strengthens the claim rather than challenges it. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This option undermines the author's central assertion that post-trial acquittals are the result of a comprehensive judicial process involving cross-examination, full evidentiary review, and legal argumentation. If, in reality, many acquittals result from procedural lapses—such as delay, case backlog, absence of witnesses, or lack of jurisdiction—then the assumption of thorough scrutiny collapses. This casts doubt on the idea that post-trial acquittals inherently carry greater legal sanctity, because their foundation is not always substantive. Hence, option (b) is the correct answer.

(c) This option is aligned with the author's view of BNSS reforms enhancing procedural rigour. Encouraging cross-examination before decision-making implies a stronger commitment to evidence-based adjudication, which reinforces the idea that acquittals post-trial are grounded in fair and deliberate analysis. Rather than weakening the claim, this option upholds it. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option also supports the author's argument by providing evidence that BNSS acquittals involve deep engagement with modern forms of evidence. If courts are incorporating digital and forensic data into judgments, it reflects the very thoroughness the author attributes to full-trial acquittals. Far from weakening the claim, it affirms the procedural robustness described in the passage. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.

101. Correct Answer: (d) Some acquittals receive greater legal protection because they are based on full procedural and evidentiary review.

Reference Line: "The sanctity of post-trial acquittals derives from their comprehensive nature..."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option presents a commonly misunderstood notion—that all acquittals, regardless of how or when they occur, grant the accused complete and irreversible

immunity. The passage directly challenges this idea by distinguishing between preliminary-stage acquittals and those resulting from a full trial, with the latter carrying more weight in terms of finality. Thus, this belief is clearly a misconception in the context of BNSS jurisprudence. Hence, option (a) is not the correct answer.

(b) This reflects another myth: that victims can freely access the Supreme Court to challenge any acquittal. The passage clarifies that such challenges are not automatic but are constrained by the requirement of special leave under Article 136, which is meant to be exceptional and not routinely granted. Hence, this statement represents a widespread misunderstanding of appellate procedures under BNSS. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) This option falsely assumes that appellate courts regard all acquittals as legally equivalent. The passage makes it clear that acquittals are not treated equally: those granted after a full trial undergo rigorous evidence review and thus enjoy greater deference than acquittals at earlier procedural stages. Believing otherwise ignores the legal hierarchy of scrutiny built into the BNSS structure. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This option accurately reflects the author's analysis and is therefore not a myth. The passage explicitly argues that full-trial acquittals, being the product of detailed judicial review, are more difficult to challenge. The author presents this not as a misconception but as a substantiated fact grounded in procedural reality. Hence, option (d) is the correct answer.

102. Correct Answer: (a) The rigid timelines under BNSS have pressured trial judges to issue decisions without allowing adequate deliberation.

Reference Line: "These reforms accelerate the adjudicatory process without compromising the substantive protection afforded to acquitted persons."

Difficulty Level: Difficult

Explanation:

(a) This option serves as a genuine counter-argument because it challenges the author's core claim: that the BNSS manages to increase procedural speed without sacrificing fairness. If judges are forced to adhere to strict timelines and, as a result, compromise on thoughtful deliberation, then procedural fairness is no longer intact. This undermines the assumption that efficiency reforms under BNSS are neutral or harmless. It points to a trade-off between speed and quality of justice. Hence, option (a) is the correct answer.


(b) This supports the author's claim rather than contradicting it. By expanding victims' appellate rights, BNSS improves access to justice and broadens procedural equity. These enhancements are consistent with the idea that reforms under BNSS are both fair and inclusive. Therefore, this cannot qualify as a counter-argument. Hence, option (b) is not the correct answer.

(c) Real-time updates and digitization directly contribute to both transparency and efficiency, two key goals mentioned in the passage. They support the view that procedural improvements are technologically driven and result in a better-managed criminal justice system without diminishing due process. As such, this reinforces the author's thesis. Hence, option (c) is not the correct answer.

(d) This statement refers to the continuity of legal logic from the CrPC to the BNSS. While it may suggest institutional inertia or slow adaptation, it does not challenge the claim that the BNSS has introduced meaningful reforms. It says nothing about fairness being compromised, nor does it imply that the new system is flawed. It is an observation, not a counter-argument. Hence, option (d) is not the correct answer.


103. Correct Answer: (d)

Explanation: Riya is Om's wife; Om is Karan's son. Hence Riya is Karan's daughter-in-law.




104. Correct Answer: (a)

Explanation: Dev is Lalit's son; Piya is Karan's daughter. Karan and Lalit are brothers, so Dev and Piya are cousins.




105. Correct Answer: (c)

Explanation: Gita → mother of Karan → grandmother of Om → great-grandmother of Om's daughter Tara.




106. Correct Answer: (b)

Explanation: Piya is married to Sahil. Sahil's mother V is Piya's mother-in-law.




107. Correct Answer: (a)

Explanation: Meera is Lalit's wife. Lalit is Karan's brother, and Om is Karan's son. Hence Meera is Om's aunt (paternal aunt by marriage).



108. Correct Answer: (b)

Explanation: Dev is Gita's grandson (through Lalit). Dev's son N is one generation below, making him Gita's great-grandson.



Section - E : Quantitative Aptitude

109. **Correct Answer:** (b)

Explanation:

$$\text{Total needed} = 4 \times 140 = 560.$$

$$\text{Sold so far} = 110 + 130 + 150 = 390.$$

$$\text{Day-4} = 560 - 390 = 170.$$

110. **Correct Answer:** (a)

Explanation:

$$\text{Total for 3 sessions} = 3 \times 70 = 210.$$

$$\text{First two total} = 72 + 78 = 150.$$

$$\text{Session-3} = 210 - 150 = 60 \text{ minutes.}$$

111. **Correct Answer:** (c)

Explanation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{First three total marks} &= 25 \times 7.2 + 20 \times 8.0 + 15 \times 6.8 = \\ &180 + 160 + 102 = 442. \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Overall: } (442 + 8.6x)/(60 + x) \geq 7.8$$

$$\Rightarrow 442 + 8.6x \geq 468 + 7.8x$$

$$\Rightarrow 0.8x \geq 26 \Rightarrow x \geq 32.5.$$

$$\text{Minimum whole } x = 33.$$

112. **Correct Answer:** (a)

Explanation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Initial total revenue} &= 60 \times 150 + 40 \times 180 = 9,000 + \\ &7,200 = ₹16,200 \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{initial average} = ₹162.$$

$$\text{Swap reduces revenue by } 10 \times (240 - 120) = ₹1,200$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{new total} = 16,200 - 1,200 = ₹15,000.$$

$$\text{New average} = 15,000/100 = ₹150.$$

113. **Correct Answer:** (c)

Explanation:

$$\text{After loss total} = 24 \times 219.5 = 5,268 \text{ g.}$$

$$\text{Replacing 206 g by 235 g adds 29 g}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{new total} = 5,268 + 29 = 5,297 \text{ g.}$$

$$\text{Average} = 5,297/24 = 220.7083... \approx 220.71 \text{ g.}$$

114. **Correct Answer:** (b)

Explanation:

$$\text{After loss total} = 24 \times 219.5 = 5,268 \text{ g.}$$

$$\text{After replacement, new total} = 24 \times 221 = 5,304 \text{ g.}$$

$$\text{Increase} = 5,304 - 5,268 = 36 \text{ g} = (235 - \text{damaged}).$$

$$\text{Hence damaged} = 235 - 36 = 199 \text{ g.}$$

115. **Correct Answer:** (c)

Explanation:

$$\text{Outer rectangle} = (8+2) \times (6+2) = 10 \times 8 = 80 \text{ m}^2.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Inner stage} &= 8 \times 6 = 48 \text{ m}^2. \text{ Carpet area} = 80 - 48 = \\ &32 \text{ m}^2. \end{aligned}$$

116. **Correct Answer:** (b)

Explanation:

$$\text{Ring area} = \pi(R^2 - r^2) = \pi(4 - 1.44) = \pi(2.56)$$

$$\text{With } \pi = 22/7$$

$$2.56 \times (22/7) = 8.0457... \approx 8.05 \text{ m}^2$$

117. **Correct Answer:** (c)

Explanation:

$$\text{Volume} = 0.75\pi r^2 h = 0.75\pi(0.25)(1.2) = 0.225\pi \text{ m}^3$$

$$\text{With } \pi = 3.14$$

$$0.225 \times 3.14 \approx 0.707 \text{ m}^3 = 707 \text{ L}$$

$$\text{Bottles} = [707/1.5] \approx 471$$

118. **Correct Answer:** (b)

Explanation:

$$\text{CSA per shade} = \pi r l = \pi(10)(26) = 260\pi \text{ cm}^2$$

$$= 260 \times (22/7) = 817.1429 \text{ cm}^2$$

For 12 shades:

$$12 \times 817.1429 = 9805.7148 \text{ cm}^2 = 0.981 \text{ m}^2$$

$$(\text{since } 10,000 \text{ cm}^2 = 1 \text{ m}^2).$$

119. **Correct Answer:** (d)

Explanation:

$$\text{Tile side} = 0.3 \text{ m}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{tile area} = 0.09 \text{ m}^2$$

$$\text{Floor needs: } (4.8/0.3) \times (3.6/0.3) = 16 \times 12 = 192 \text{ tiles.}$$

Outer (with one extra row each side):

$$(4.8+0.6) \times (3.6+0.6) = 5.4 \times 4.2 = 22.68 \text{ m}^2$$

$$\text{Tiles bought} = 22.68/0.09 = 252$$

$$\text{Unused} = 252 - 192 = 60 \text{ tiles}$$

120. **Correct Answer:** (a)

Explanation:

$$\text{TSA of one box} = 2(lw + lh + wh)$$

$$= 2(20 \cdot 15 + 20 \cdot 10 + 15 \cdot 10)$$

$$= 2(300 + 200 + 150) = 1300 \text{ cm}^2$$

$$\text{With 5\% extra: } 1300 \times 1.05 = 1365 \text{ cm}^2 \text{ per box.}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{For 6 boxes: } &1365 \times 6 = 8190 \text{ cm}^2 = 8190/10000 = \\ &0.819 \text{ m}^2. \end{aligned}$$